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Introduction			 The	topic	of	political	polarization	in	America	is	one	that	has	increasingly	become	of	interest	to	scholars	and	political	pundits	alike,	particularly	as	the	American	political	system	has	begun	to	feel	the	effects	of	higher	levels	of	polarization	in	government.	These	affects	include,	but	are	not	limited	to,	a	state	of	gridlock	in	Congress,	increased	hostility	between	the	two	parties	both	in	and	out	of	government,	and	an	erosion	of	bipartisanship.	The	focus	of	my	research	was	to	evaluate	some	of	the	main	proposed	reforms	that	aim	to	address	political	polarization	to	determine	which	single	reform	was	most	worthwhile	of	pursuit.			 The	reforms	I	focused	on	fell	into	four	distinct	categories,	the	first	of	which	were	governmental	reforms.	These	reforms	propose	altering	or	eliminating	certain	governmental	procedures	or	rules	that	exacerbate	the	consequences	of	political	polarization.	The	second	area	of	reform	I	focused	on	relates	to	the	political	parties	in	America.	The	reforms	discussed	in	that	section	look	at	how	strengthening	political	parties,	primarily	their	role	in	elections,	can	affect	political	polarization.	The	third	area	that	I	discussed	was	reforms	that	target	the	American	electorate.	The	reforms	in	this	section	specifically	focus	on	creating	a	more	informed	electorate	as	a	means	of	addressing	political	polarization.	The	final	area	of	reforms	I	analyze	deal	with	the	American	electoral	system.	These	reforms	look	at	altering	various	aspects	of	the	system	including	primary	elections	and	redistricting	procedures.			 In	order	to	determine	which	of	the	reforms	is	most	worthy	of	pursuing	I	asked	and	answered	two	main	questions	for	each	reform.	The	two	guiding	questions	
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are:	does	this	reform	affect	political	polarization	and	what	is	the	political	viability	of	the	reform.	The	first	question	is	of	course	essential	as	a	proposed	reform	is	of	no	use	if	it	cannot	successfully	affect	political	polarization.	The	question	regarding	political	viability	is	also	significant	as	what	good	is	a	reform	if	it	stands	no	chance	of	actually	coming	to	fruition.			 After	evaluating	each	of	the	reforms	using	the	two	aforementioned	questions,	I	concluded	that	the	proposal	dealing	with	the	American	electorate,	specifically	the	reform	that	aims	to	provide	a	non-partisan	election	information	guide	to	all	voters,	was	the	reform	that	was	most	worthy	of	pursuit.	Not	only	does	this	reform	possess	a	strong	political	viability	due	to	the	fact	that	members	of	both	parties	would	support	expanding	election	information,	but	also	it	has	the	ability	to	impact	political	polarization	significantly.	Studies	have	shown	that	voters	are	likely	to	alter	their	vote	choice	and	ideological	alignment	when	presented	with	substantive	information	about	an	election,	something	that	if	implemented	nationwide	would	undoubtedly	alter	the	outcomes	of	hundreds	of	elections.	Thus,	the	proposed	reform	that	creates	a	non-partisan	election	information	guide,	once	implemented,	would	directly	affect	the	type	of	individuals	elected	to	government	and	therefore	likely	lower	the	levels	of	political	polarization.			 	
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Chapter	1:	An	Overview	of	Political	Polarization	in	America			 The	issue	of	political	polarization	in	America	is	one	that	is	widely	discussed	and	debated	for	its	implications	are	far	reaching,	affecting	everything	from	our	government’s	ability	to	do	its	job	to	the	reality	of	our	electoral	process.	As	will	be	discussed	in	depth	later	on,	political	polarization	has	influenced	the	type	of	legislation	that	Congress	produces,	the	competitiveness	of	elections	both	nationally	and	at	the	local	level,	and	affected	the	levels	of	political	engagement	amongst	the	American	public.		 	Before	discussing	the	sources,	trends,	effects	and	potential	solutions	to	political	polarization	it	is	crucial	to	have	a	basic	definition	of	the	term.	Political	polarization	in	America	is	often	defined	as	“the	sorting	of	political	convictions	by	either	the	mass	public	or	ruling	elites,	or	both,	into	roughly	two	distinct	camps:	persons	inclined	to	support	[either]	the	Democratic	or	Republican	parties’	policies	and	candidates	for	office”	(Nivola,	2005,	2).	Furthermore,	it	is	important	to	differentiate	between	issue	polarization,	which	focuses	on	policy	and	issues,	and	affective	polarization	which	is	defined	as	“the	tendency	of	people	identifying	as	Republicans	or	Democrats	to	view	opposing	partisans	negatively	and	co-partisans	positively”	(Iyengar	and	Westwood	2014,	691).	Going	forward	the	discussion	of	political	polarization	will	address	both	issue	and	affective	polarization,	with	shifting	emphasis	when	appropriate.		 In	order	to	fully	understand	political	polarization	in	America,	it	is	important	to	discuss	several	aspects	of	the	phenomenon.	First,	I	will	address	the	trends	in	political	polarization	amongst	both	the	American	public	as	well	as	in	government.	
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Secondly,	I	will	discuss	the	causes	of	polarization	in	order	to	illustrate	what	factors	combined	to	lead	to	what	we	see	today.	Next,	I	will	discuss	the	impact	of	political	polarization,	addressing	three	aspects:	what	has	happened	to	our	government,	what	has	happened	to	the	electoral	reality,	and	what	has	changed	in	American	political	discourse	and	the	two	political	parties.	Finally,	I	will	look	at	the	potential	solutions	that	have	been	put	forth	thus	far	that	attempt	to	mitigate	political	polarization	in	America.		
Trends	in	Political	Polarization			 As	scholars	have	evaluated	the	trends	in	levels	of	political	polarization	amongst	the	American	public,	there	has	been	some	differing	in	opinion	as	to	what	has	occurred.		Scholars	such	as	Alan	Abramowitz	(2015a),	Reiter	(2010)	and	Carson,	Finocchiaro,	and	Rohde	(2007)	believe	that	the	American	electorate	has,	in	fact,	become	increasingly	polarized,	while	individuals	such	as	Matt	Levendusky	(2009),	Samuel	Abrams	and	Morris	Fiorina	(2015)	argue	that	the	American	public	has	become	sorted,	but	not	polarized.			 Proponents	of	the	theory	of	increased	political	polarization	amongst	the	American	public,	such	as	Alan	Abramowitz	(2015a),	draw	upon	a	whole	host	of	data	that	examines	the	trends	of	the	American	public’s	ideology,	how	they	view	the	opposing	party,	and	views	on	issues	to	illustrate	that	in	fact	the	public	has	become	polarized.	Abramowitz	(2015a,	25)	highlights	the	2012	American	National	Election	Study	(ANES)	which	shows	that	“91	percent	of	party	identifiers,	including	leaning	independents,	voted	for	their	own	party’s	candidate.	This	was	the	highest	level	of	
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party	loyalty	in	any	presidential	election	since	the	ANES	began	asking	the	party	identification	question	in	1952.”	In	fact,	the	American	electorate	does	not	confine	their	party	loyalty	to	simply	the	presidential	election,	with	Abramowitz	(2015a,	26)	noting,	“92	percent	of	Obama	voters	supported	a	Democratic	House	candidate,	while	92	percent	of	Romney	voters	supported	a	Republican	House	candidate.”	The	election	results	of	2012	continued	the	trend	of	straight	ticket	voting	and	party	loyalty	in	America,	both	of	which	have	only	become	stronger	in	recent	electoral	cycles	(Abramowitz	2015a).				 Those	who	claim	that	the	American	electorate	has	become	increasingly	polarized	also	draw	upon	studies	that	examine	the	ideological	shifts	of	the	public.	A	study	conducted	by	Dimock,	et.	al	(2014)	illustrates	the	numerous	ways	in	which	the	two	parties	have	diverged	ideologically	in	the	last	few	decades.	In	2014,	23	percent	of	Democrats	indicated	that	they	hold	political	values	that	are	consistently	liberal,	compared	to	only	five	percent	of	Democrats	that	indicated	the	same	in	1994.	During	the	same	time	period	the	share	of	Republicans	who	indicated	that	they	hold	political	values	that	are	consistently	conservative	increased	as	well	from	13	percent	in	1994	to	20	percent	in	2014.	In	that	same	study,	Dimock,	et.	al	analyzed	the	overlap	in	ideology	between	the	two	parties.	In	1994,	64	percent	of	Republicans	were	more	conservative	than	the	median	Democrat,	while	70	percent	of	Democrats	were	more	liberal	than	the	median	Republican.	In	2014	those	figures	were	up	to	92	percent	for	Republicans	and	94	percent	for	Democrats.	The	data	from	Dimock,	et.	al	(2014)		indicates	both	that	the	ideological	overlap	between	the	two	parties	almost	
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entirely	disappeared	and	that	both	parties	have	shifted	away	from	one	another	ideologically.			 The	notion	that	the	American	electorate	has	become	increasingly	polarized	is	also	supported	by	trends	in	the	American	electorate’s	feelings	towards	the	opposition	party,	commonly	referred	to	as	affective	polarization.	The	same	Dimock,	et.	al	(2014)	study	also	asked	the	participants	to	describe	how	they	view	the	opposing	party,	finding	that	79	percent	of	Democrats	and	82	percent	of	Republicans	viewed	the	opposition	party	unfavorably.	Of	those	figures,	38	percent	of	Democrats	and	43	percent	of	Republicans	viewed	the	opposition	very	unfavorably.	Both	of	these	responses	are	higher	than	they	were	in	1994,	when	only	57	percent	of	Democrats	and	68	percent	of	Republicans	viewed	the	opposition	unfavorably,	and	only	16	percent	of	Democrats	and	17	percent	of	Republicans	viewed	the	opposing	party	very	unfavorably.	Abramowitz	(2015a)	points	out,	using	candidate	thermometer	data	from	the	ANES,	that	the	American	electorate	has	also	become	deeply	polarized	in	how	they	view	presidential	candidates.	In	1984,	the	difference	between	how	Republicans	viewed	Reagan	and	Mondale	and	how	Democrats	viewed	Reagan	and	Mondale	was	on	average	71.8	degrees	apart.	Moving	to	2012,	the	difference	between	how	Republicans	viewed	Romney	and	Obama	and	how	Democrats	viewed	the	two	candidates	was	105.2	degrees	apart.	Abramowitz	(2015a,	40)	writes,	“The	large	increase	in	partisan	polarization	on	relative	thermometer	ratings	of	the	presidential	candidates	between	1984	and	2012	is	especially	impressive	given	that	the	choices	presented	to	the	voters	by	the	two	major	parties	appeared	to	be	no	more	polarized	in	2012	than	in	1984.”	What	is	
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implied	by	that	is	that	when	analyzing	the	two	major	candidates’	stances	on	issues,	and	voting	records	in	office,	one	would	be	hard-pressed	to	argue	that	Obama	was	more	liberal	than	Walter	Mondale	or	that	Romney	was	more	conservative	than	Reagan,	and	thus	the	party	difference	in	thermometer	ratings	should	be	roughly	the	same,	not	43	degrees	apart.	Abramowitz	and	others	claim	that	the	increased	levels	of	negativity	amongst	the	American	public	for	the	opposition	party	and	candidates	is	evidence	that	there	has	been	an	increase	in	levels	of	polarization.			 Aside	from	voting	patterns	and	feeling	thermometers,	scholars	have	also	looked	at	how	the	American	electorate	has	polarized	along	certain	factors.	McCarty,	Poole,	and	Rosenthal	(2016)	note	the	correlation	between	levels	of	political	polarization	and	income	inequality,	noting	that	the	public	has	become	polarized	based	on	income.	Both	Reiter	(2010)	and	Carson,	Finocchiaro,	and	Rohde	(2007)	note	the	degree	to	which	the	American	public	has	become	polarized	based	on	geographic	location,	particularly	in	the	Northeast	and	the	South	as	well	as	the	effects	that	redistricting	has	had	on	the	correlation	between	the	two	factors.	Abramowitz	(2015a)	also	notes	how	the	country	has	polarized	on	the	lines	of	gender	and	race,	with	Democrats	getting	more	of	the	female	and	minority	vote	and	Republicans	receiving	the	majority	of	white	and	male	voters.	Scholars	who	believe	that	the	American	public	has	become	polarized	point	to	these	and	other	factors	to	illustrate	their	claims.		 Scholars	like	Levendusky	(2009)	and	Abrams	and	Fiorina	(2015)	oppose	the	theory	that	the	American	public	has	become	politically	polarized,	instead	arguing	that	the	electorate	has	become	increasingly	sorted.	Like	advocates	of	the	theory	of	
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polarization,	proponents	of	the	sorted	theory	utilize	data	illustrating	how	the	American	public	has	shifted	politically	over	the	years	to	explain	the	phenomenon	of	sorting	that	they	believe	to	have	occurred	in	America.			 To	explain	party	sorting	amongst	the	American	public	it	is	important	to	understand	that	advocates	of	this	theory	do	not	dispute	the	presence	of	political	polarization	in	American	but	instead	they	believe	that	only	the	party	elites,	such	as	elected	officials,	have	become	polarized.	In	fact,	Levendusky	(2009)	believes	that	elite	polarization	is	the	source	of	all	party	sorting	in	America;	breaking	the	process	into	four,	distinct	steps.	Levendusky	(2009,	37)	writes,	“As	elites	polarize,	they	clarify	where	the	parties	stand	on	the	issues	of	the	day…	Voters	then	use	these	clearer	elite	cues	to	align	their	own	partisanship	and	ideology,	that	is,	to	sort.”	Additionally,	both	Levendusky	(2009)	and	Abrams	and	Fiorina	(2015)	blame	the	role	of	the	media	in	emboldening	the	claim	that	the	American	public	has	become	increasingly	polarized.			 The	main	evidence	utilized	by	supporters	of	the	sorted	theory	is	the	lack	of	change	in	party	identification	amongst	the	American	public.	The	Dimock,	et	al	(2014)	study	exemplifies	this	in	its	analysis	of	party	identification	over	the	last	60	years.	Currently,	30	percent	of	the	electorate	identifies	as	a	member	of	the	Republican	Party,	a	figure	that	is	nearly	unchanged	from	60	years	ago.	The	Democratic	Party	has	seen	a	drop	in	affiliation,	with	only	35	percent	identifying	as	a	member	of	the	party,	down	from	nearly	50	percent	in	the	1950s.	Finally,	the	percentage	of	Americans	identifying	as	independent	has	increased	from	20	percent	in	1952	to	35	percent	in	2014.	If	the	American	public	has	become	polarized,	the	
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question	that	Levendusky,	Abrams	and	Fiorina	ask	is	why	has	that	not	resulted	in	any	change	in	the	party	identification	of	Americans?	How	could	there	be	a	greater	number	of	individuals	who	identify	as	independent	of	the	two	political	parties	while	the	country	is	supposedly	becoming	more	divided?	Instead,	these	scholars	point	to	sorting	to	explain	this	phenomenon.			 As	opposed	to	a	great	alteration	in	the	makeup	of	the	American	electorate,	advocates	of	the	sorting	theory	believe	that	“party	and	ideology	are	more	tightly	aligned	in	the	mass	electorate	than	they	were	a	generation	ago”	(Levendusky	2009,	77).	What	Levendusky	means	by	this	is	that	the	general	public	is	more	likely	to	take	their	stances	on	issues	from	the	cues	presented	by	their	party	elites.	As	a	result	of	elite	polarization,	more	individuals	are	likely	to	define	themselves	as	liberal	or	conservative,	adopt	the	stances	of	their	party	and	the	parties	themselves	have	become	more	ideologically	homogeneous	(Levendusky	2009).	This	reality	cannot	only	explain	issue	attitudes	of	voters,	but	also	political	evaluations	and	voting	behavior	of	the	electorate.		 To	explain	why	the	American	electorate	has	gone	sour	on	the	opposition	party	and	their	candidates	over	the	years	Abrams	and	Fiorina	(2015)	simply	point	to	the	nature	of	party	sorting.	If	the	two	political	parties	have	become	sorted	as	Abrams	and	Fiorina	(2015,	122)	claim,	it	would	follow	suit	that	“If	a	Republican	president	adopts	an	agenda	at	the	mode	of	his	party,	his	policies	will	be	farther	away	from	more	Democrats	on	average…	hence,	more	[Democrats]	will	disapprove	and/or	disapprove	more	strongly.”	The	same	applies	to	how	a	sorted	electorate	views	the	opposing	party,	as	the	individual	and	the	opposition’s	party	viewpoints	on	
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an	issue	grow	apart,	the	more	likely	they	are	to	view	that	party	in	a	negative	light.	The	loyalty	of	the	sorted	electorate	also	explains	the	trends	in	voting	behavior.	The	elections	of	1968	and	1972	saw	sizable	portions	of	one	party	cross	party	lines	to	vote	for	the	opposition,	something	that	Abramowitz	(2015a)	points	out	does	not	occur	today.	As	was	true	in	the	case	of	political	and	candidate	evaluations,	individuals	are	unlikely	to	vote	for	a	candidate	that	does	not	share	their	views	on	issues,	which	has	increasingly	become	the	case	as	the	parties	have	become	more	sorted.	Thus	is	why,	Abrams	and	Fiorina	(2015)	argue,	91	percent	of	individuals	who	align	with	a	particular	party	voted	for	that	party’s	candidate	in	2012.			 The	debate	over	whether	or	not	the	American	public	has	become	polarized	is	vibrant,	with	both	sides	interpreting	the	changes	in	the	electorate	in	different	ways.	Scholars	in	support	of	both	theories	do	not	argue	as	to	whether	or	not	political	elites	have	become	polarized,	nor	do	they	argue	as	to	whether	or	not	the	share	of	liberal	and	conservative	voters	has	increased	in	the	country.	Instead	their	debate	centers	on	what	has	been	the	cause	of	these	changes.	Supporters	of	the	polarized	theory	do	not	see	a	way	in	which	an	increase	in	party	sorting	could	be	the	cause	of	the	racial	and	gender	divide	in	our	country.	Likewise,	supporters	of	the	sorted	theory	do	not	see	evidence	of	polarization	in	the	party	identification	of	the	American	public,	something	that	would	be	apparent	if	polarization	was	widespread.	Supporters	of	both	sides	do	not	dispute	that	changes	have	occurred,	but	rather	attribute	different	phenomenon	as	to	why	they	have	taken	place.			 When	we	as	a	country	focus	on	the	state	of	politics	in	America,	it	is	likely	that	any	analysis	will	rely	heavily	on	references	to	Congress.	Since	the	people	choose	
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their	members	of	Congress,	it	should	be	the	case	that	their	policy	positions	and	actions	will	mirror	the	ideological	makeup	of	our	country,	but	it	has	become	abundantly	clear	that	this	is	not	the	case.	McCarty,	Poole,	and	Rosenthal	(2016),	in	their	analysis	of	members	of	Congress,	find	that	there	has	been	an	increase	in	representation	of	extremely	conservative	as	well	as	extremely	liberal	members.	Similar	to	what	Levendusky	(2009)	points	out	amongst	the	general	public,	McCarty,	Poole,	and	Rosenthal	(2016)	find	that	members	of	Congress	too	have	begun	to	define	themselves	more	so	as	either	liberal	or	conservative	and	within	that	they	have	begun	to	identify	as	more	extreme	in	their	views.	Not	only	does	this	indicate	that	there	has	been	a	disappearance	of	moderates	in	Congress,	but	it	also	indicates	that	the	Democratic	and	Republican	parties	have	undergone	significant	alterations	over	the	years.			 The	change	in	the	ideological	views	of	the	two	political	parties	has	shifted	for	both	particularly	in	the	last	century.	McCarty,	Poole,	and	Rosenthal	(2016,	31)	note	that	since	the	1970’s	the	Democratic	Party	has	become	homogeneous	“as	the	party’s	moderate	southern	wing	has	almost	vanished.”	Republicans,	on	the	other	hand,	have	also	seen	a	seen	a	change	in	the	composition	of	their	party,	as	“its	moderates	have	also	vanished,	but	they	have	been	replaced	by	extreme	conservatives.	The	effect	of	the	two	changes	has	been	to	hold	homogeneity	constant	as	the	party	has	shifted	to	the	right,”	(McCarty,	Poole,	and	Rosenthal	2016,	31;	see	also	Abramowitz	2011).		As	McCarty,	Poole,	and	Rosenthal	(2016)	illustrate,	the	two	parties	have	become	increasingly	polarized,	leading	to	an	exiting	of	moderates	on	both	sides,	which	has	
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effectively	left	the	middle	empty,	something	that	is	exemplified	in	the	policy	positions	of	members	of	Congress.		 It	used	to	be	the	case,	in	Congress,	that	there	was	a	degree	of	overlap,	of	common	ground	between	the	two	parties	(McCarty,	Poole,	and	Rosenthal	2016).	In	fact,	in	between	1933	and	1941,	there	was	approximately	a	17	percent	overlap	in	the	Senate,	meaning	that	17	percent	of	the	members	of	the	Senate	had	political	views	that	were	closer	to	the	average	view	of	the	opposition	party	than	they	were	to	their	own	affiliated	party	(McCarty,	Poole	and	Rosenthal	2016).	What	is	evident	by	this	fact	is	that	just	as	Abrams	and	Fiorina	(2015)	point	out,	the	voting	behavior	of	the	American	electorate	has	become	more	single-party	support.	Additionally,	there	has	also	been	a	trend	in	more	polarized	voting	habits	for	members	of	Congress	(McCarrty,	Poole,	and	Rosenthal	2016).	What	results	from	this	is	a	great	deal	of	gridlock,	something	that	will	be	discussed	at	length	in	a	later	section,	but	also	in	the	emergence	of	partisan	warriors	and	the	Tea	Party	movement	(Abramowitz	2011).		 While	there	have	always	been	stalwarts	in	Congress,	the	increased	levels	of	polarization	amongst	members	of	Congress	has	led	to	the	emergence	of	partisan	warriors,	who	engage	in	legislative	warfare	to	prevent	the	opposition	from	achieving	their	goals.	Theriault	(2015)	uses	the	term	to	describe	individuals	like	Jim	DeMint,	Ted	Kennedy,	and	Rand	Paul,	who,	during	their	time	in	office,	utilized	legislative	warfare	tactics,	most	specifically	the	use	of	roll	call	votes	on	amendments,	to	grind	the	governing	process	to	a	halt	and	prevent	their	opposition	from	finding	legislative	success.	In	fact,	individuals	like	Kennedy	and	Paul	only	exemplify	the	ongoing	trend	of	obstruction	in	the	Senate,	as	Theriault	(2015,	164)	finds	that	
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“during	the	10	congresses	since	1993,	the	minority	party	senators	are	responsible	for	two-thirds	more	amendment	roll	call	votes	than	the	majority	party	senators.”	This	is	indicative	of	the	multi-faceted	approach	that	the	minority	parties	have	used	in	Congress	to	delay	the	ability	of	their	opposition	to	pass	legislation,	something	that	frankly	did	not	occur	in	a	less	polarized	state	of	government	(Theriault	2015).		 While	in	the	last	half	century	there	is	a	valid	debate	as	to	whether	or	not	the	American	public	has	become	politically	polarized,	there	is	not	much	debate	surrounding	the	increased	levels	of	polarization	that	has	occurred	in	Congress.	In	order	to	understand	the	underlying	causes	behind	this	phenomenon,	it	is	important	to	analyze	a	bevy	of	factors.		
Causes	of	Political	Polarization		 		 As	the	trend	of	political	polarization	in	America	has	become	more	thoroughly	analyzed,	so	too	has	the	analysis	of	the	potential	causes	of	polarization	in	our	country.	Thus	far,	scholars	have	centralized	their	analysis	on	both	internal	and	external	factors.	The	external	factors,	that	is	factors	outside	of	government	itself,	that	will	be	discussed	include:	redistricting,	the	southern	realignment,	the	nature	of	the	economy,	the	structure	of	primary	elections,	and	money	in	politics.	The	internal	factors,	factors	that	are	within	the	government	that	will	be	discussed	are:	the	centralization	of	power	in	government	to	party	leaders,	the	breakdown	of	bipartisan	norms,	and	rule	changes.			 One	of	the	most	common	responses	to	what	has	caused	the	political	polarization	in	America	is	redistricting.	Redistricting	describes,	“the	process	of	
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periodically	drawing	district	boundaries	to	ostensibly	align	them	with	communities	of	interest,	representational	criteria,	and	neutral	administrative	goals,	such	as	equalizing	populations	following	a	new	decennial	census”	(Altman	and	McDonald	2015,	45).	The	nature	of	redistricting	provides	value	as	it	ensures	that	every	citizen	is	represented	properly	and	adequately.	The	problem	with	redistricting	occurs	when	politicians	utilize	it	to	uniquely	favor	their	electoral	viability,	by	redrawing	districts	that	create	homogenous	partisan	constituencies,	which	solidifies	one	party’s	control	(Carson,	Finocchiaro,	and	Rohde	2007;	see	also	Altman	and	McDonald	2015).	The	new	districts	result	in	changes	in	the	type	of	elected	officials	that	are	supported,	with	ideologically	extreme	candidates,	who	were	previously	unviable	in	a	more	moderate	district,	winning	out.	The	impact	of	redistricting	has	not	only	been	felt	at	the	Congressional	level	but	also	during	presidential	elections	as	the	number	of	states	that	are	up	for	grabs	have	decreased	over	the	years	(Altman	and	McDonald	2015).	Gerrymandering	has	made	our	elections	at	nearly	every	level	less	competitive,	for	it	has	limited	the	access	of	moderates	to	political	office,	while	at	the	same	time	emboldened	partisan	politics.	This	combination	has	enabled	ideological	poles	of	the	two	parties	to	have	significant	sway	over	the	discourse	of	government.		 A	second	factor	that	is	often	cited	as	a	potential	cause	of	the	polarization	in	our	country	is	the	Southern	realignment.	The	South	went	under	a	massive	transformation	during	the	Civil	Rights	era,	shifting	from	solidly	Democratic	to	solidly	Republican	in	just	under	a	decade.	In	1950,	the	South	accounted	for	zero	percent	of	Republican	Senate	seats,	compared	to	2014	where	it	accounted	for	nearly	
		 17	
90	percent	of	Republican	seats	in	the	Senate	(McCarty,	Poole,	and	Rosenthal	2016).	The	story	is	the	same	for	the	House,	where	the	South	accounted	for	roughly	five	percent	of	Republican	seats	in	1950,	a	far	cry	off	from	the	nearly	80	percent	figure	that	the	South	made	up	in	2014	(McCarty,	Poole,	and	Rosenthal	2016).	The	transition	of	the	South	from	the	Democratic	to	the	Republican	Party	fundamentally	altered	the	two	parties,	as	the	great	influence	of	the	South	led	to	an	influx	of	its	values	in	the	Republican	Party,	including	the	migration	of	Christian	conservatives	to	the	party.	While	Southern	realignment	made	the	Democratic	Party	more	liberal,	as	the	moderate	wing	of	its	party	was	lost	when	the	South	left,	the	Republican	Party’s	conservative	wing	was	only	emboldened	as	the	Southerners	who	joined	espoused	conservative	social	views	and	molded	their	economic	values	into	the	party.			 Much	has	been	said	about	the	impact	that	money	has	had	on	politics,	more	specifically	on	elections	in	our	country,	so	it	should	come	as	no	surprise	that	there	are	some	who	blame	the	current	state	of	polarization	on	the	influence	of	money.	The	influence	of	money	has	grown	tremendously	as	the	cost	of	campaigning	increases.	McCarty	and	Barber	(2015,	31)	note,	“Since	1990,	the	average	amount	of	money	spent	in	US	House	elections	has	nearly	doubled	in	real	terms.”	This	influx	of	money	is	partly	due	to	the	rise	of	PACs	and	Super	PACs,	but	a	great	deal	can	be	attributed	to	wealthy	individual	donors.	McCarty	and	Barber	(2015)	focus	more	on	the	individual	contributors,	as	they	show	that	in	2012	nearly	80	percent	of	a	candidate’s	funds	came	from	individual	donors,	while	just	under	20	percent	came	from	PACs.	Of	the	individual	donors,	recent	years	have	seen	a	surge	in	the	percentage	of	funds	that	came	from	individuals	donors	that	are	out-of-district,	as	in	1990	less	than	60	
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percent	of	individual	contributions	came	from	out-of-district,	while	in	2012	that	figure	was	above	85	percent	(McCarty	and	Barber	2015).	This	fact	is	of	concern	due	to	the	reality	that	ideologically	extreme	individuals	are	more	likely	to	donate	to	political	campaigns	than	moderates	(Dimock,	et.	al	2014).	Therefore	an	increase	in	the	importance	of	ideologically	extreme	donors	might	lead	to	candidates	altering	their	viewpoints	to	gain	access	to	an	important	resource	(Ensley	2009).		The	ability	to	raise	money	is	something	that	determines	whether	or	not	a	candidate	is	viable,	and	with	the	increased	pressure	to	raise	great	sums,	candidates	may	be	altering	their	political	stances	to	match	the	more	ideologically	extreme	donors	in	order	to	remain	politically	viable.			 Another	factor	that	many	scholars	have	focused	on	as	a	cause	of	polarization	is	the	nature	of	the	economy,	specifically	the	increased	levels	of	economic	inequality.	McCarty	and	Barber	(2015)	indicate	that	economic	inequality	and	polarization	have	tracked	together	in	the	last	50	years,	for	during	times	when	inequality	was	low	so	too	were	the	levels	of	polarization	and	when	inequality	was	high	as	it	is	presently	so	too	are	the	levels	of	polarization.	The	changing	economic	circumstances	have	also	impacted	the	political	realities	of	individual	congressional	districts	as	“district	income	[has	become]	a	direct	and	indirect	effect	on	the	conservatism	of	the	district’s	House	member,”	(McCarty,	Poole,	and	Rosenthal	2016,	46).	McCarty,	Poole,	and	Rosenthal	(2016)	illustrate	this	fact	by	analyzing	the	share	of	votes	that	the	Republican	Party	gets	in	the	125	richest	and	125	poorest	Congressional	districts.	They	found	that	between	2003	and	2014	the	vote	share	in	the	wealthiest	districts	was	an	average	of	51.2	percent,	while	in	the	poorest	districts	
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it	was	only	36.6	percent.	McCarty,	Poole,	and	Rosenthal	(2016)	explain	this	reality	by	arguing	that	the	increase	in	economic	inequality	leads	to	an	increase	in	top-earners	incomes,	which	translates	to	greater	support	for	conservative	economic	policies	and	thus	leads	to	the	Republican	Party	to	shift	to	its	right	fiscally.	As	many	in	the	public	vote	with	their	checkbook,	it	should	follow	that	an	increase	in	economic	inequality	would	lead	to	a	shift	in	the	levels	of	polarization	as	the	disparity	between	the	incomes	of	Americans	at	the	top	and	bottom	increases.			 A	final	factor	that	many	scholars	point	to	as	directly	affecting	the	levels	of	polarization	in	America	is	our	country’s	primary	election	system.	Scholars	point	out	that	in	closed	primary	systems,	the	most	likely	voters	to	turn	out	are	highly	partisan,	which	results	in	the	general	election	candidates	being	more	conservative	or	liberal	than	the	public	(Dimock,	et.	al	2014).	Many	observers	suggest	that	switching	to	an	open	primary	system,	where	independents	can	participate,	results	in	candidates	that	align	more	so	with	the	general	election	electorate	than	the	primary	electorate	(McCarty	and	Barber	2015,	from	Kaufmann,	Gimpel	and	Hoffman	2003).	In	fact,	several	states	including	the	nation’s	most	populous	state,	California,	have	switched	over	to	open	primaries	in	the	hopes	of	altering	the	ideological	makeup	of	the	primary	victors	(McGhee	et.	al	2014).	The	importance	of	understanding	the	impact	our	voting	system	has	on	the	levels	of	polarization	is	crucial	as	a	variety	of	different	primary	systems	may	produce	a	whole	host	of	different	results	that	can	sway	the	degree	to	which	our	nation’s	politicians	are	polarized.		 Aside	from	the	external	factors	that	are	mentioned	above,	scholars	have	also	focused	on	the	impact	of	changes	in	the	nature	of	our	government,	one	of	which	is	
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the	increased	power	that	party	leaders	have	obtained	in	House	and	Senate.	McCarty	and	Barber	(2015,	36)	write,	“party	leaders	in	the	House	and	Senate	have	become	increasingly	powerful	and	as	such,	can	apply	greater	pressure	on	members	to	vote	along	party	lines.”	With	their	expanded	reach,	party	leaders	can	provide	various	incentives	including	funds	for	reelection	campaigns	or	placement	on	a	particular	committee	(Theriault	2008).	Members	of	Congress	feel	increased	pressure	to	align	with	their	party	leaders	given	the	increased	level	of	control	that	they	possess	over	party	agenda	and	overall	functionality	of	government	(Theriault	2008).	Additionally,	Theriault	(2015)	notes	that	party	leaders	have	an	outsized	role	in	obstructionism,	and	given	their	increased	control	there	is	less	likelihood	that	party	members	will	object	or	dissent.	Thus,	if	the	party	leaders	have	become	increasingly	polarized,	which	Theriault	(2015)	demonstrates	to	be	true,	it	would	follow	suit	that	individual	members	fall	in	line	with	those	who	have	the	power.			 A	second	internal	factor	that	scholars	point	to	is	the	alteration	of	rules	in	Congress.	In	recent	years	the	House	made	procedural	changes	that	“made	it	easier	for	amendments	to	be	proposed	when	considering	legislation,”	(McCarty	and	Barber	2015,	35).	The	new	amendments	that	were	being	added	were	often	completely	unrelated	to	the	bill	and	were	used	as	a	partisan	ploy	to	create	a	roadblock	to	legislating,	as	members	had	to	choose	between	voting	on	a	controversial	amendment	or	having	their	proposed	legislation	die	(McCarty	and	Barber	2015,	Snowe	2013).	Although	this	may	have	affected	the	levels	of	polarization	in	the	House,	as	McCarty	and	Barber	(2015)	note,	it	does	not	directly	explain	the	same	increase	in	levels	of	polarization	in	the	Senate,	which	Snowe	(2013)	illustrates.	It	
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may	be	the	case	that	members	of	the	two	houses	of	the	legislative	branch	take	cues	from	one	another	and	the	changes	that	have	occurred	in	the	House	have	in	spirit	made	their	way	to	the	Senate,	but	as	of	now,	there	is	no	quantitative	evidence	to	prove	that	hypothesis.			 A	final	potential	source	of	polarization	in	Congress	that	scholars	point	to	is	the	breakdown	of	bipartisan	norms	in	Congress.	This	deals	with	the	nature	of	how	members	of	Congress	choose	to	allocate	their	time	between	D.C.	and	their	district	among	other	factors.	McCarty	and	Barber	(2015,	38)	note,	“in	the	past	several	decades,	members	of	Congress	have	increasingly	chosen	not	to	relocate	their	families	to	Washington	and	therefore	spend	far	less	time	there	and	more	time	home	in	their	home	districts.	This	lack	of	time	in	Washington	has	made	it	more	difficult	to	form	the	personal	relationships	that	would	foster	bipartisan	trust	and	civility.”	In	other	words,	as	members	of	Congress	have	chosen	to	spend	less	of	their	time	in	Washington,	there	has	been	a	breakdown	in	outside-of-work	relationships	between	members,	which	was	often	been	a	focal	point	in	fostering	bipartisanship.			
Impact	of	Political	Polarization			 While	the	impact	that	political	polarization	has	on	our	country	is	still	unfolding,	scholars	have	already	begun	to	analyze	some	of	the	more	defined	challenges	polarization	has	caused.	Scholars	who	have	studied	the	impacts	of	political	polarization	typically	have	focused	their	analysis	on	three	aspects:	what	polarization	has	done	to	our	government’s	ability	to	govern,	what	polarization	has	done	to	the	electoral	map,	and	finally	what	polarization	has	done	to	general	political	
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discourse	and	the	two	major	political	parties.	As	a	closer	reading	will	show,	the	impact	that	political	polarization	has	had	on	our	country	is	profound	even	at	such	a	young	stage.			 In	recent	years	it	seems	as	if	Congress	has	been	in	a	constant	state	of	gridlock.	Members	complain	about	an	inability	to	get	anything	done,	even	the	simple	budget	authorizations,	which	used	to	be	routine,	have	now	become	drawn-out,	complex	processes	(Lee	2013).	Olympia	Snowe,	a	former	Senator	from	Maine,	became	so	frustrated	that	she	declined	to	run	for	another	term	due	to	the	effects	of	polarization	on	the	Senate	that	prevented	her	from	doing	her	job.	Snowe	(2013,	27)	states,	“much	of	what	occurs	today	is	what	is	often	called	‘political	messaging.’	Rather	than	putting	forward	a	plausible,	realistic	solution	to	a	problem,	members	on	both	sides	offer	legislation	that	is	designed	to	make	a	political	statement.”	Snowe’s	observed	trend	in	the	type	of	legislation	that	is	put	forth	is	something	that	was	highlighted	earlier	by	McCarty	and	Barber	(2015)	as	well	as	Theriault	(2015).	Snowe	(2013)	also	comments	on	the	filibuster,	something	that	has	been	used	to	grind	the	functionality	of	the	Senate	to	a	complete	halt	with	more	regularity	in	recent	years.	The	filibuster	has	not	only	been	used	to	prevent	the	opposition	from	quickly	passing	their	legislation,	but	also	as	a	platform	for	partisan	warriors	to	raise	their	profile	and	embolden	their	fellow	ideologically	extreme	representatives.		Furthermore,	Snowe	(2013)	highlights	the	impact	of	two,	more	recently	utilized	strategies,	the	cloture	motion	and	what	is	called	“filling	the	amendment	tree.”	The	cloture	motion,	which	is	utilized	by	the	majority	leader,	prevents	the	minority	party	from	debating	a	bill	or	filing	a	filibuster.	In	fact,	as	Snowe	(2013,	29)	notes,	“in	the	
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last	three	Congresses,	the	Senate	has	reached	triple	digits	in	the	number	of	cloture	motions	filed-shattering	the	previous	high	of	eighty-two	motions.”	Not	only	has	the	number	of	cloture	motions	filed	increased	but	so	too	has	the	frequency	of	majority	leaders	filling	the	amendment	tree	(Sinclair	2008).	This	practice	enables	the	majority	leader	to	decide	which	amendments	the	Senate	will	vote	upon	effectively	limiting	the	minority	party’s	rights.	Regardless	of	the	tactic	being	utilized,	it	is	clear	that	members	of	Congress	have	begun	to	use	their	abilities	to,	depending	on	their	party’s	control,	either	inhibit	the	opposition’s	ability	to	obstruct	them	or	to	try	and	obstruct	the	opposition.	No	matter	how	you	look	at	it,	Congress	has	transformed	into	a	deeply	polarized	and	highly	dysfunctional	body,	as	members	of	Congress	have	begun	to	more	regularly	abuse	the	intentions	of	the	rules	and	procedure	to	further	their	partisan	goals.			 Aside	from	discussing	the	rules	that	are	employed	by	members	of	Congress	in	order	to	prevent	legislative	success	for	the	opposition,	there	has	also	been	a	legitimate	impact	on	the	quality	and	type	of	legislation	that	occurs	in	Congress	(Lee	2013).	Sinclair	(2008),	highlights	the	fact	that	a	great	deal	of	the	talented	Congressional	staffers	left	for	more	lucrative	lobbyist	positions,	leaving	less	knowledgeable	staffers	to	draft	major	pieces	of	legislation.	Furthermore,	appropriations	bills	have	become	more	regularly	used	to	boost	up	the	candidacies	of	weak	incumbents	in	election	years.	Sinclair	(2008,	80)	cites	the	instance	of	1996	when	then-Speaker	Newt	Gingrich,	“sent	a	memo	to	Appropriations	subcommittee	leaders	urging	them	to	support	projects	in	the	districts	of	politically	vulnerable	Republicans.”	Factoring	in	the	impact	of	Snowe’s	(2013)	aforementioned	tactics	has	
		 24	
led	to	very	little	bipartisanship,	for	as	the	political	attractiveness	and	viability	of	bipartisan	bills	decreases,	members	begin	to	emphasize	their	ideologically	extreme	views.			 Moving	to	an	analysis	of	how	political	polarization	has	impacted	the	electoral	realities	of	America,	it	is	clear	that	for	one,	our	elections	have	become	nationalized	at	nearly	every	level	(Levendusky,	Pope,	and	Jackman	2008).		In	their	study	of	presidential	and	congressional	elections	from	1952	to	2000,	Levendusky,	Pope,	and	Jackman	(2008)	find	a	strong	correlation	between	the	district-level	vote	for	a	presidential	election	and	the	outcome	of	the	Congressional	election	in	that	district.	They	find	that	“district-level	vote	shares	in	presidential	and	congressional	elections	have	become	more	tightly	tied	to	partisanship,”	(Levendusky,	Pope,	and	Jackman	2008,	750).	Jones	(2015)	also	finds	this	correlation	to	be	true,	noting	that	there	is	a	correlation	between	the	levels	of	polarization	in	Congress,	how	individuals	evaluate	the	job	done	by	Congress	and	how	they	vote	up	and	down	the	ballot.	In	other	words,	as	the	parties	have	separated,	our	elections	have	become	increasingly	nationalized,	with	little	difference	between	how	a	district	votes	in	its	congressional	election	and	how	it	votes	in	the	presidential	election.	Voters	have	begun	to	take	a	more	nationalized	view	of	the	two	parties,	associating	the	work	done	in	Congress	to	represent	the	larger	party	at	whole,	as	well	as	the	candidates	who	run	on	party	lines.				 An	implication	that	is	drawn	from	the	work	conducted	by	Levendusky,	Pope,	and	Jackman	(2008)	as	well	as	Jones	(2015),	is	something	that	Abramowitz	and	Webster	(2016)	point	out:	the	American	electorate	is	demonstrating	the	highest	
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levels	of	straight	ticket	voting	and	party	loyalty	in	the	past	half-century.	In	2012,	90	percent	of	ballots	demonstrated	straight-ticket	voting,	an	all-time	high	for	presidential	elections	(Abramowitz	and	Webster	2016).	The	figures	for	party	loyalty	also	set	an	all-time	high	in	2012,	with	81	percent	of	all	party	identifiers	saying	that	they	are	consistently	loyal	(Abramowitz	and	Webster	2016).	As	party	identifiers	grow	increasingly	loyal	and	vote	straight-ticket,	we	have	seen	an	increase	in	the	level	of	competition	in	presidential	elections	as	well	as	a	decrease	in	the	levels	of	competition	in	Congressional	elections.		Presidential	elections	today	are	more	competitive	than	ever,	as	Alan	Abramowitz	(2015a,	20)	notes,	“Of	the	17	presidential	elections	between	1920	and	1984,	10	were	won	by	a	double-digit	margin.	But	there	hasn’t	been	a	landslide	election	since	Ronald	Reagan’s	drubbing	of	Walter	Mondale	in	1984.”	Although	the	outcomes	of	presidential	elections	have	tightened	significantly	over	the	years,	there	has	been	a	decrease	in	the	number	of	states	that	are	actually	competitive,	both	in	the	presidential	race	but	also	at	the	Congressional	level.	Abramowitz	(2015a,	21)	highlights	that	for	the	2012	election,	“only	four	states	were	decided	by	a	margin	of	less	than	five	percentage	points:	Florida,	Ohio,	Virginia,	and	North	Carolina.	On	the	other	hand,	27	states,	as	well	as	the	District	of	Columbia	were	decided	by	a	margin	of	at	least	15	percentage	points.”	This	is	compared	to	the	1976	election	where	20	states	were	won	by	less	than	five	percentage	points.	This	trend	also	continues	when	you	analyze	the	Congressional	races.	Abramowitz	(2015a,	22)	gives	some	insight	noting	that	in	the	1976	election	only	26	districts	were	decided	by	margins	of	20	points	or	greater,	compared	to	232	districts	in	2012.	In	this	highly	polarized	state	of	America,	elections	have	become	
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both	competitive	and	uncompetitive,	for	as	many	states	and	districts	see	a	decrease	in	the	competitiveness	of	their	elections,	the	presidential	results	tighten.			 A	final	alteration	that	scholars	have	tied	to	the	increased	levels	of	political	polarization	is	the	change	in	the	political	engagement	by	Americans.	Marc	Hetherington	(2008)	analyzed	various	indicators	of	political	engagement	for	the	electorate	between	the	years	of	1952	and	2004.	He	found	that	the	polarized	nature	of	politics	has	not	deterred	Americans	from	participating	in	the	electoral	process,	as	the	voting-eligible	population	turnout	was	60	percent	in	2004,	the	same	as	it	was	in	1956,	and	only	three	points	lower	than	the	high	of	63	percent	in	1960.	Hetherington	(2008)	also	broke	down	voter	turnout	by	ideological	affiliation	and	found	that	self-identified	conservatives	and	liberals	were	more	likely	to	turnout	than	moderates	and	nonideologues	were.	Liberals	and	conservatives	were	also	more	likely	to	indicate	that	they	are	“very	much	interested	in	the	election,”	with	liberals	and	conservatives	hovering	around	50	percent	and	only	30	percent	of	moderates	indicating	the	same	(Hetherington	2008).	While	Hetherington	(2008)	does	note	that	because	of	the	increased	levels	of	polarization	amongst	party	elites	it	would	follow	suit	that	the	ideologues	amongst	the	electorate	would	be	energized,	but	he	also	notes	that	moderates	have	followed	suit	in	their	increased	likelihood	that	they	participate	in	the	electoral	process.	While	many	of	the	effects	of	political	polarization	have	been	negative,	based	on	the	data	that	Hetherington	(2008)	provides,	it	seems	as	if	polarization	has	had	some	positive	impact	as	it	has	led	to	more	Americans	being	engaged	in	politics.	
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	 Not	only	has	the	American	electorate	become	more	likely	to	vote	and	be	engaged	in	an	election,	but	they	have	also	increased	their	levels	of	nonvoting	participation	in	elections.	In	his	same	analysis,	Hetherington	(2008)	found	that	in	the	2004	election,	Americans	set	all-time	high	in	the	percentage	of	participation	in	giving	to	campaigns,	attempting	to	influence	others’	votes,	and	displaying	campaign	stickers	or	other	paraphernalia.	Hetherington	(2008,	8)	notes,	“the	present	polarized	period	has	seen	a	remarkable	increase	in	a	range	of	different	forms	of	political	involvement.”	While	Hetherington’s	(2008)	analysis	does	not	break	that	new	form	of	participation	down	into	ideologues	versus	non-ideologues,	the	Dimock,	et.	al	(2014)	study	found	that	liberals	and	conservatives	were	far	more	likely	than	their	moderate	peers	to	partake	in	nonvoting	forms	of	electoral	participation.			
Original	Research		 It	is	apparent,	from	the	extensive	research	conducted	by	scholars,	that	the	levels	of	political	polarization	in	Congress	have	increased,	and	the	impacts	of	this	trend	are	widespread.	Scholars	have	also	studied	potential	reforms	that	would	help	reduce	political	polarization	in	America,	but	it	is	important	to	evaluate	each	of	these	proposed	reforms	in	order	to	understand	which	should	be	prioritized	in	order	to	reduce	the	level	of	polarization	and	its	effects.			 In	attempting	to	reduce	the	levels	of	political	polarization	and	its	effects,	scholars	have	targeted	several	areas	for	reform,	which	will	be	fleshed	out	in	the	following	chapters	and	follow	as	such:	government	reforms,	political	party	reforms,	electorate	reforms,	and	electoral	reforms.		Government	reform,	which	will	be	discussed	at	length	in	chapter	2,	targets	the	rules	and	procedures	of	Congress	that	
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enable	partisan	warfare	and	gridlock.	Specifically,	I	will	be	focusing	on	reforms	to	the	filibuster	and	the	debt	ceiling.	Political	party	reform,	which	will	be	addressed	in	chapter	3,	seeks	to	strengthen	the	parties	to	lessen	the	effects	of	polarization.	Electorate	reform,	which	is	the	focus	of	chapter	4,	looks	at	how	we	can	create	a	more	knowledgeable	electorate	that	will	elect	less	ideologically	extreme	politicians.	Finally,	electorate	reform,	which	is	the	subject	of	chapter	5,	seeks	to	alter	the	way	in	which	our	nation’s	elections	are	held,	who	participates	in	them,	and	what	is	important	to	them.			 The	reforms	that	will	be	analyzed,	which	were	stated	above,	will	be	evaluated	for	both	their	viability	and	how	much	impact	they	would	likely	have	on	reducing	the	levels	of	political	polarization.	Additionally,	a	series	of	five	questions	will	be	answered	for	each	of	the	reforms	discussed	in	this	work.	Those	five	questions	are:	what	is	the	reform,	what	is	the	problem	the	reform	aims	to	solve,	how	is	that	problem	related	to	political	polarization,	does	the	reform	affect	political	polarization,	and	what	is	the	political	viability	of	the	reform.	Depending	on	the	reform	there	may	or	may	not	be	quantitative	data	supplied	from	the	reform’s	implementation,	for	example	the	effects	of	open	primary	systems	or	mandatory	voting	could	be	analyzed	by	looking	at	the	effects	of	their	implementation,	but	altering	our	nation’s	political	parties	can	only	be	discussed	through	a	philosophical	lens	as	it	many	of	its	proposals	have	yet	to	be	implemented.		 		
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Chapter	2:	Governmental	Reforms	As	previously	noted,	when	scholars	or	political	pundits	look	to	illustrate	the	effects	that	political	polarization	has	on	our	country	they	point	to	Congress.	As	Snowe	(2013),	Theriault	(2015)	and	others	have	noted,	there	has	been	a	tremendous	increase	in	the	utilization	of	Congressional	rules	and	procedures	to	further	their	partisan	politics.	The	actions	of	members	of	Congress	and	their	success	in	derailing	the	opposition’s	policies	are	why	a	great	deal	of	focus	has	come	on	reforming	Congress	in	order	to	curb	the	effects	of	polarization.	As	was	detailed	in	the	previous	chapter,	elected	officials	in	Congress	now	are	almost	always	in	a	state	of	partisan	warfare.	This	means	that	rather	than	focusing	on	working	together	to	create	solutions,	members	of	both	parties	intentionally	use	the	procedural	rules	of	Congress	to	impede	their	opposition’s	progress	on	a	piece	of	legislation,	nomination	or	other	matter	before	the	legislative	body.	Abramowitz	(2015b)	argues	that	America	needs	to	adopt	a	form	of	party	democracy,	in	which	the	party	who	wins	control	of	government	is	able	to	govern	their	way	until	the	next	election,	but	he	remarks	that	there	must	be	several	changes	in	order	to	loosen	the	grip	that	the	minority	party	has	on	the	legislative	process.	He	highlights	two	reforms	that	could	be	implemented	that	would	aide	in	the	reduction	of	party	polarization:	filibuster	reform	and	getting	rid	of	the	debt	ceiling.	Abramowitz	(2015b,	205)	writes,	“the	minority	does	not	need	even	more	protection	against	the	will	of	the	majority	in	the	Senate,”	and	calls	for	the	Senate	to	remove	the	filibuster	entirely.	Additionally,	he	suggests	that	the	burden	of	gathering	votes	should	be	on	those	wishing	to	filibuster.	Secondly,	Abramowitz	(2015b)	calls	for	the	abolition	of	the	debt	ceiling,	which	he	
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decries	as	a	tool	for	members	of	Congress	to	use	for	political	manipulation.	The	reforms	discussed	by	Abramowitz	(2015b)	highlight	a	sentiment	held	by	many	scholars,	that	the	procedural	rules	that	govern	Congress	have	become	an	impediment	to	legislating.	It	is	important	to	establish	that	these	reforms	do	not	directly	aim	to	fundamentally	alter	the	motor	by	which	our	federal	government	functions,	but	instead	attempt	to	curb	the	repeated	manipulation	of	the	rules	and	procedures	of	the	body,	which	has	rendered	the	legislative	body	almost	entirely	useless.	That	is	to	say	that	the	rules	that	govern	Congress	have	transformed	into	something	entirely	different	than	what	their	intentions	were	and	thus	have	become	more	of	an	obstacle	than	of	an	aide	to	the	body. 	 Furthermore,	for	each	reform,	the	following	questions	will	be	asked:	what	is	the	reform,	what	is	the	problem	the	reform	aims	to	solve,	how	is	that	problem	related	to	political	polarization,	how	does	the	reform	address	political	polarization,	and	what	is	the	political	viability	of	the	reform.	Answering	all	of	these	questions	enable	us	to	get	a	better	grasp	for	how	effective	the	reform	will	be.	For	this	chapter	and	all	future	chapters,	the	goal	is	to	determine	which	of	the	reforms	discussed	in	the	chapter	is	most	worthwhile	of	pursuit.	
History	of	the	Filibuster:			 Before	jumping	directly	into	reforms	that	propose	altering	the	filibuster,	it	is	important	that	some	background	history	is	provided	on	the	filibuster	itself.	 The	term	filibuster,	which	is	defined	as	“an	action	such	as	a	prolonged	speech	that	obstructs	progress	in	a	legislative	assembly,”	is	often	synonymous	with	elongated	
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speeches	made	by	Senators	as	a	form	of	protest,	but	in	fact,	the	rule	has	predominantly	been	used	without	the	grandiose	speeches	(Senate	Historical	Office,	2016).	Beginning	in	1917,	with	President	Woodrow	Wilson,	the	filibuster	has	repeatedly	been	altered	as	a	means	of	limiting	the	impact	that	it	can	have	on	the	legislative	process	(U.S.	Senate	Historical	Office	2016).	A	popular	opinion	regarding	the	filibuster	is	that	it	is	too	powerful,	as	it	has	the	ability	to	grind	the	legislative	process	to	a	halt,	and	thus	in	periods	of	immense	gridlock	measures	are	taken	to	roll	back	the	reach	of	the	filibuster.	Such	was	the	case	in	1975	when	the	Senate	altered	its	cloture	rule	to	only	require	three-fifths	as	opposed	to	two-thirds	votes	to	end	a	filibuster	on	any	piece	of	legislation	(U.S.	Senate	Historical	Office	2016).		 Closely	related	to	the	filibuster,	and	of	a	great	deal	of	importance,	are	cloture	motions.	As	was	mentioned	earlier,	filibusters	occur	more	often	than	one	might	think,	and	are	normally	not	accompanied	by	a	12	hour-long	speech.	These	filibusters	come	through	cloture	motions.	In	the	Senate,	any	individual	Senator	can	file	a	cloture	motion	on	a	piece	of	legislation	or	action	the	body	must	take,	as	a	result	a	roll	call	vote	must	be	held	(U.S.	Senate	Historical	Office	2016).	In	order	for	cloture	to	be	invoked,	there	must	be	60	“Yay”	votes,	without	the	sufficient	votes,	debate	on	a	particular	action	or	bill	cannot	end	and	thus	no	further	action	can	be	taken	on	a	bill,	effectively	killing	it.	Thus,	cloture	motions	have	the	ability	to	act	in	a	similar	manner	to	filibusters	and	many	consider	the	two	Senate	procedures	to	be	the	same.		
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Proposal:	Requiring	60	Senators	to	Vote	in	Favor	of	
Filibustering		 		 On	its	face,	this	reform	is	quite	a	big	change	from	the	present	situation,	as	the	burden	of	finding	votes	is	now	placed	on	the	individual	Senator	or	group	of	Senators	who	wish	to	delay	the	voting	or	hearing	of	a	piece	of	legislation.	As	is	the	case	now,	any	individual	member	of	the	Senate	may	filibuster	a	bill	on	their	own,	but	also	must	find	at	least	40	of	their	colleagues	to	support	their	measure,	in	order	to	ensure	that	they	have	sufficient	support	when	the	cloture	motion	is	voted	upon.	Under	the	implementation	of	this	proposal,	Senators	would	now	have	to	secure	60	of	their	colleague’s	support	in	order	to	ensure	that	their	blockade	of	further	action	is	upheld	when	the	cloture	motion	is	voted	upon.		 The	problem	that	this	reform	aims	to	resolve	is	that	there	have	been	far	too	many	filibusters	and	failed	cloture	motions	in	the	Senate,	which	has	tremendously	hindered	the	body’s	ability	to	govern.	In	the	113th	Congress	(2013-2014)	alone,	there	were	66	pieces	of	legislation	that	failed	to	receive	the	necessary	votes	for	cloture	to	be	invoked,	effectively	leaving	those	bills	dead	in	the	water	(U.S.	Senate	Records	2016).	This	problem	creates	a	system	by	which	our	government	functions	at	an	astoundingly	ineffective	pace,	often	struggling	to	produce	the	necessary	budgetary	bills	in	a	timely	manner	each	year.	By	removing	this	barrier	from	the	Senate,	the	body	would	once	again	be	able	to	function	normally,	helping	rid	Congress	as	a	whole	of	its	dysfunctional	nature.			 The	problem	of	a	dysfunctional	Congress	is	one	that	is	directly	related	to	the	levels	of	political	polarization	in	America,	as	the	dysfunctional	state	of	the	federal	
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government	is	a	direct	byproduct	of	the	levels	of	political	polarization	present	in	the	system.	Specifically,	there	is	a	correlation	between	the	levels	of	polarization	in	government	and	the	frequency	by	which	the	filibuster	and	cloture	motions	are	utilized.	I	used	data	from	the	Pew	Research	Center	(DeSilver	2014)	on	the	ideological	makeup	of	Congress	to	illustrate	this	relationship.	Starting	with	the	93rd	Congress	(1973-74)	there	were	29	senators	who	had	an	ideological	voting	record	that	fell	between	the	most	conservative	Democrat	and	the	most	liberal	Republican.	During	the	93rd	Congress,	there	were	44	cloture	motions,	filed,	of	which	9	were	invoked.	During	the	103rd	Congress	only	three	senators	had	ideological	voting	records	that	fell	between	the	most	conservative	Democrat	and	the	most	liberal	Republican,	and	during	that	session	80	cloture	motions	were	filed,	14	of	which	were	invoked.	Finally,	in	the	112th	Congress,	there	was	no	overlap	ideologically	in	the	Senate	and	there	were	115	cloture	motions	filed,	and	41	of	them	were	invoked.	What	is	illustrated	by	this	information	is	that	not	only	is	there	a	relationship	between	the	levels	of	political	polarization	in	government	and	the	functionality	Congress,	but	that	both	the	filibuster	and	cloture	motions	have	become	increasingly	more	common	as	the	ideological	divide	in	Congress	has	grown.			 This	reform,	which	aims	to	shift	the	burden	of	obtaining	votes	to	Senators	who	favor	filibustering	a	bill	by	requiring	60	“Nay”	votes	to	prevent	any	further	action	on	a	piece	of	legislation,	can	sufficiently	address	one	of	the	main	effects	of	political	polarization.	In	that	sense,	this	proposal	is	unlike	many	of	the	others	that	will	be	discussed	throughout	this	work,	as	it	does	not	aim	to	directly	affect	the	overall	levels	of	political	polarization,	but	instead,	its	aim	is	to	simply	mitigate	the	
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effects	of	political	polarization.	Enacting	this	reform	would	almost	certainly	lead	to	a	significant	reduction	in	the	number	of	bills	that	are	either	filibustered	on	fail	to	have	cloture	invoked,	as	it	would	make	the	legislative	obstruction	process	much	more	difficult.	This	is	particularly	true,	as	neither	party	has	held	a	60-seat	majority	since	the	95th	Congress	(1977-1979)	when	Democrats	controlled	61	of	the	100	chamber	seats	(U.S.	Senate	Records	2016).	Acknowledging	this	reality	is	why	this	proposed	reform	would	significantly	reduce	the	dysfunction	of	the	Senate,	as	obstructive	measures	would	now	require	Senators	gaining	bipartisan	support	for	their	efforts.	Presently,	with	the	burden	of	support	placed	on	those	who	wish	to	continue	progress	on	a	bill,	Senators	from	the	minority	party,	provided	that	their	party	possesses	at	least	40	seats,	can	effectively	prevent	further	Senate	by	producing	support	from	just	within	their	party.	To	further	illustrate	the	added	difficulty	that	this	new	reform	would	impose,	I	looked	at	the	degree	of	bipartisanship	voting	on	cloture	motions	in	the	112th,	113th,	and	114th	Congresses.	Unsurprisingly	the	overwhelming	majority	of	cloture	motion	votes	held	in	all	three	Congressional	sessions	were	cast	along	party	lines	(U.S.	Senate	Records	2016).	This	fact	shows	how	not	only	it	is	currently	difficult	to	gain	bipartisan	support	for	a	cloture	motion,	but	also	indicates	how	difficult	it	would	be	to	gain	significant	bipartisan	support	against	invoking	cloture	and	the	filibuster.	Thus,	by	effectively	limiting	the	degree	to	which	the	minority	party	can	obstruct	the	legislative	agenda	of	the	majority	party,	this	reform	creates	a	more	functional	Senate,	in	the	sense	that	there	will	be	fewer	obstacles	on	the	path	to	creating	legislation.	
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	 Moving	to	an	examination	of	the	political	viability	of	the	proposal	to	require	60	Senators	to	support	to	vote	in	favor	of	a	filibuster,	I	believe	that	this	reform	does	not	have	a	strong	likelihood	of	being	enacted.	The	reason	why	I	believe	this	reform	is	unlikely	to	even	come	into	existence	is	that	the	reform	would	fundamentally	shift	America	away	from	protecting	the	views	and	the	voice	of	the	minority.	By	allowing	the	majority	party	of	the	Senate	to	effectively	govern	as	they	see	fit,	this	reform	quashes	the	balance	of	government	and	injects	undemocratic	values	into	the	federal	government.	As	a	result,	I	believe	both	parties	would	be	quite	unlikely	to	support	such	a	proposal,	as	they	would	fear	that	the	day	would	come	that	their	affiliated	political	party	became	the	minority	party.	Additionally,	even	publicly	considering	this	reform	would	almost	certainly	cause	a	great	deal	of	backlash	from	constituents	and	democratic	observers,	who	would	oppose	such	a	proposal	on	the	grounds	that	were	mentioned	earlier.	Thus,	based	on	these	notions	I	believe	that	this	reform,	rather	than	being	politically	viable,	is	quite	politically	unviable.	
Proposal:	Removing	the	Filibuster	Altogether			 In	addition	to	those	who	simply	aim	to	alter	the	process	by	which	a	filibuster	can	be	implemented	in	the	Senate,	there	are	those	who	suggest	that	the	procedure	altogether	should	be	eliminated.	This,	of	course,	is	a	more	extreme	option	that	the	previous	proposal,	as	this	proposal	would	leave	no	avenue	for	recourse,	regardless	of	the	level	of	support	in	favor	or	against	a	particular	bill	or	action	no	action.	As	is	stated	in	the	title	of	the	reform,	this	proposal	would	eliminate	cloture	votes	and	the	
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filibuster,	as	well	as	prevent	further	obstruction	that	is	currently	derived	from	the	use	of	these	two	Senate	procedures.			 As	this	reform	and	the	prior	reform	are	quite	similar,	the	problem	that	both	aim	to	solve	are	identical,	so	too	is	the	way	in	which	that	problem	is	related	to	political	polarization.	To	reiterate	both,	the	problem	that	this	reform	aims	to	solve	is	that	there	have	been	far	too	many	filibusters	and	cloture	motions	in	the	Senate,	which	has	led	to	a	significant	period	of	gridlock	and	dysfunction	in	the	legislative	body.	This	problem	directly	relates	to	the	issue	of	political	polarization,	as	there	is	a	relationship	between	both	the	frequency	of	filibusters	and	the	volume	of	cloture	motions	filed	and	the	level	of	political	polarization	in	the	Senate.	The	only	difference	between	the	two	proposals	is	the	methods	by	which	they	aim	to	solve	the	problem.			 It	is	clear	that	this	reform	would	affect	political	polarization	by	mitigating	its	effects	on	the	legislative	process.	In	fact,	this	reform	is	likely	to	be	more	effective	it	mitigating	the	effects	of	political	polarization	than	the	previous	reform	as	this	proposal	suggests	that	the	problem	itself	be	eliminated.	Without	the	existence	of	filibusters	or	cloture	motions	there	can	be	very	little	obstruction	in	the	Senate,	and	thus	their	elimination	would	mean	that	the	problem	of	a	gridlocked	Senate	would	no	longer	exist.	Again,	the	implementation	of	this	reform	would	almost	certainly	mean	that	the	majority	party	would	be	allowed	to	govern	without	constraint,	effectively	reducing	the	minority	party	to	no	more	than	a	political	symbol.	Of	course,	as	the	implementation	of	this	reform	would	almost	certainly	result	in	partisan	tension,	in	my	opinion	there	would	be	a	negative	impact	on	the	levels	of	political	polarization.	What	makes	this	reform	unique	is	that	although	I	believe	it	would	make	the	problem	
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of	political	polarization	worse	off,	it	would	lessen	the	impact	that	political	polarization	has	on	Congress.			 Looking	at	the	political	viability	of	this	reform,	I	believe	that	the	proposal	to	eliminate	the	filibuster	and	cloture	motion	votes	would	be	a	political	dead	end.	Not	only	does	this	reform	raise	similar	concerns	about	the	rights	of	the	minority	in	government,	it	goes	further	eliminating	all	possible	recourse	for	protection.	Thus,	in	my	opinion	politicians	who	propose	or	suggest	the	implementation	of	this	reform	would	not	only	face	immense	criticism	from	their	constituents	and	democracy	organizations,	but	I	believe	that	this	reform	is	on	patchy	legal	ground,	in	the	sense	that	even	if	it	were	to	be	implemented	that	the	courts	might	strike	it	down	for	violating	the	principles	laid	out	in	the	Constitution.		
History	of	the	Debt	Ceiling			 Prior	to	moving	on	to	a	discussion	of	a	proposed	reform	that	aims	to	alter	the	debt	ceiling	as	a	means	of	addressing	political	polarization,	it	is	important	that	some	background	information	is	provided	on	the	debt	ceiling	itself.			 The	debt	ceiling,	also	sometimes	known	as	the	debt	limit,	is	defined	by	the	U.S.	Department	of	the	Treasury	(2016)	as,	“the	total	amount	of	money	that	the	United	States	government	is	authorized	to	borrow	to	meet	its	existing	legal	obligations,	including	Social	Security	and	Medicare	benefits,	military	salaries,	interest	on	the	national	debt,	tax	refunds,	and	other	payments.”	Throughout	history,	it	was	not	uncommon	for	both	parties	in	government	to	raise	the	ceiling,	or	even	for	one	administration	to	raise	the	debt	limit	multiple	times.	In	fact,	it	has	been	raised	
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roughly	90	times	since	its	creation	in	1914.	Historically,	raising	the	debt	ceiling	was	an	uncontroversial	issue,	one	that	warranted	little	discussion	as	both	parties	understood	the	importance	of	keeping	the	country	financially	afloat.	It	was	only	recently	that	the	process	of	raising	the	debt	ceiling	became	controversial,	and	at	the	root	of	that	controversy	was	partisan	warfare.		 The	recent	notable	U.S.	debt	ceiling	crises	occurred	in	2013	when	House	Republicans	refused	to	raise	the	debt	ceiling	without	some	concessions	pertaining	to	cutting	federal	government	spending.	In	January	of	2013,	the	U.S.	had	reached	the	then	maximum	level	of	debt,	which	was	$16.4	trillion	dollars,	thus	calling	into	question	the	ability	of	the	U.S.	Treasury	to	repay	the	loans	of	the	U.S.	government	(Austin	2015).	This	is	just	one	example	of	a	debt-ceiling	crisis,	but	this	example	models	the	typical	circumstances	by	which	these	crises	occur,	noting	that	one	party,	who	controls	Congress,	threatens	to	not	raise	the	debt	ceiling	and	thus	make	the	U.S.	unable	to	pay	its	loans,	without	some	sort	of	legislative	concession	from	their	opposition	party.	Debt	ceiling	crises	represent	a	new	tactic	in	partisan	warfare,	as	one	party	threatens	to	risk	the	financial	solvency	of	the	U.S.	if	their	political	demands	are	not	met,	effectively	forcing	their	opposition	to	compromise.		
Proposal:	Enable	the	President	to	Unilaterally	Raise	the	Debt	
Ceiling				 This	reform	aims	to	alter	the	process	by	which	the	debt	ceiling	is	raised,	by	shifting	the	control	of	the	process	from	Congress	to	the	President.	Currently,	as	is	the	case	with	most	of	the	federal	budgetary	matters,	the	President	puts	forth	his	proposals,	which	are	taken	into	consideration	by	the	House,	which	is	officially	in	
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charge	of	all	financials	for	the	U.S.	government.	After	the	implementation	of	this	reform,	the	President	would	unilaterally	raise	the	debt	ceiling	as	he	or	she	saw	fit	without	regard	for	Congressional	opinion.			 The	problem	that	this	reform	is	designed	to	target	is	the	fact	that	raising	the	debt	ceiling	has	become	a	partisan	warfare	tactic.	By	using	holding	the	ability	of	the	U.S.	to	pay	its	debts	hostage,	politicians	have	not	only	jeopardized	the	solvency	of	America,	but	they	have	also	reduced	the	efficiency	by	which	the	federal	government	functions.	The	use	of	the	debt	ceiling	as	a	hostage	in	partisan	warfare	is	a	reckless	and	destructive	tactic	that	poses	a	significant	threat	to	both	the	finances	of	the	U.S.	and	to	the	functionality	of	the	federal	government.			 Like	the	proposals	that	deal	with	the	filibuster,	the	problem	this	reform	aims	to	address	is	directly	related	to	political	polarization.	This	reform	aims	to	mitigate	an	effect	of	the	levels	of	political	polarization;	in	this	case	how	political	polarization	has	transformed	raising	the	debt	ceiling	into	a	hostage	of	partisan	warfare.	In	order	to	determine	the	relationship	between	instances	of	debt	ceiling	crises	and	the	levels	of	political	polarization,	I	again	revisited	the	work	of	DeSilver	(2014)	on	the	ideological	makeup	of	Congress	and	compared	it	to	instances	of	debt	ceiling	crises.	Prior	to	1995,	there	was	no	controversy	surrounding	the	raising	of	the	debt	ceiling,	in	fact	prior	to	that	year	the	“Gephardt	Rule”	was	in	effect	that	ruled	that	every	time	a	new	budget	was	passed	the	debt	ceiling	was	raised	(Austin	2015).	The	“Gephardt	Rule”	was	put	in	place	in	1979,	an	era	that	DeSilver	(2014)	shows	to	still	possess	a	degree	of	bipartisan	overlap,	as	240	members	of	the	House	possessed	an	ideological	voting	record	that	fell	between	the	most	conservative	Democrat	and	the	most	liberal	
		 40	
Republican.	Fast	forward	to	the	1990s,	when	the	debt	ceiling	controversy	begins,	and	DeSilver	(2014)	notes	that	there	were	only	9	members	of	the	House	that	had	that	type	of	voting	record.	In	2011,	during	the	2011	debt	ceiling	crises	and	two	years	prior	to	the	aforementioned	2013	crises	no	members	of	the	House	of	Representatives	possessed	such	a	voting	record.	Thus,	as	the	levels	of	political	polarization	have	risen	in	Congress,	so	too	has	the	frequency	by	which	the	debt	ceiling	has	been	used	as	a	political	threat.			 This	reform	attempts	to	remove	the	debt	ceiling	from	the	grasp	of	political	polarization	by	adjusting	the	process	by	which	the	debt	ceiling	can	be	raised.	Instead	of	having	to	go	to	Congress	to	raise	the	debt	ceiling,	the	President	him	or	herself	controls	the	process,	thus	eliminating	any	threat	of	crisis.	I	believe	that	this	reform	possesses	some	benefits,	but	also	is	not	entirely	effective	in	how	it	addresses	the	problem.	First,	the	benefits	that	I	believe	this	proposed	reform	has	is	that	in	many	cases	it	would	be	quite	effective	in	preventing	the	debt	ceiling	from	being	manipulated	for	political	negotiations,	as	whoever	is	the	President	would	simply	raise	the	debt	ceiling	when	the	ceiling	itself	was	approaching	avoiding	all	conflict.	Although	effective	in	this	nature,	the	main	problem	I	see	with	this	reform	is	that	if	the	President	were	to	reverse	the	present	situation,	by	refusing	to	raise	the	debt	ceiling	if	Congress	does	not	abide	by	his	or	her	political	will.	In	that	situation,	the	reform	would	have	had	no	impact	on	addressing	the	effect	of	political	polarization,	and	instead	simply	shifts	the	power	from	Congress	to	the	President.	This	downside	calls	into	question	the	degree	to	which	this	reform	can	effectively	mitigate	the	effects	of	political	polarization.		
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	 Analyzing	the	political	viability	of	this	reform,	it	is	my	estimation	that	this	proposal	would	face	some	significant	opposition	from	the	Republican	Party.	As	was	the	case	in	the	2013	crises,	as	well	as	in	earlier	crises,	members	of	the	Republican	Party	in	Congress	were	the	individuals	who	took	the	debt	ceiling	hostage	in	order	to	coerce	Democrats	to	succumb	to	their	legislative	demands	(Austin	2015).	Not	only	would	Republicans	oppose	this	reform	because	it	would	strip	them	of	a	valued	tool	for	political	negotiation,	but	also	they	would	be	deeply	opposed,	as	the	implementation	of	this	reform	could	create	a	scenario	by	which	the	U.S.	debt	limit	could	be	continuously	raised.	Furthermore,	there	would	likely	be	those	in	both	parties	who	would	be	troubled	by	giving	unilateral	control	over	the	debt	ceiling	to	the	President,	for	not	only	would	it	go	against	the	“power	of	the	purse”	but	it	would	certainly	unbalance	the	scales	of	equality	between	the	three	branches	of	government.	Although	there	would	surely	be	many	individuals	and	politicians	who	would	find	merit	in	the	proposal	to	give	the	President	unilateral	control	over	raising	the	debt	ceiling,	in	my	opinion,	there	are	far	too	many	troubling	aspects	of	the	reform	that	would	cause	it	to	be	politically	unviable.		
Proposal:	Eliminate	the	Debt	Ceiling		 Revisiting	Abramowitz’s	(2015b)	proposal	to	eliminate	the	debt	ceiling	entirely,	one	finds	a	great	deal	of	overlap	between	this	proposal	and	the	prior	reform,	which	allows	the	President	to	take	unilateral	control	over	the	debt	ceiling.	Eliminating	the	debt	ceiling	entirely	would	differ	from	the	previous	proposal	in	the	sense	that	the	Treasury	Department	would	be	allowed	to	automatically	raise	the	debt	limit	of	the	country	without	having	to	ask	Congress.	This	reform	would	make	
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certain	that	the	federal	spending	limit	does	not	become	a	hostage	to	partisan	tactics.	The	Treasury,	which	keeps	track	of	and	pays	the	country’s	bills,	would	be	able	to	raise	the	limit	if	the	Congressional	budget	did	not	already	account	for	it.	With	the	impending	threat	of	a	financial	shutdown	of	the	U.S.	government	out	to	the	way,	Congressional	leaders	and	the	White	House	could	use	their	time	to	negotiate	other	pieces	of	legislation.			 The	problem	that	this	reform	aims	to	address,	as	well	as	how	that	problem	is	related	to	political	polarization	are	the	same	as	the	prior	reform	discussed.	Both	acknowledge	the	relationship	between	the	debt	ceiling	and	the	levels	of	political	polarization	and	attempt	to	mitigate	the	effects	that	the	current	levels	of	political	polarization	has	on	how	America	raises	its	debt	limit.			 In	my	opinion,	this	reform	would	be	far	more	effective	than	the	previously	discussed	reform,	as	it	would	remove	the	risk	of	the	debt	ceiling	being	held	hostage	entirely	off	the	table	by	making	it	an	automatic	process.	By	making	the	raising	of	the	debt	ceiling	automatic,	this	reform	not	only	removes	a	tool	from	the	partisan	warfare	toolbox	but	also	removes	one	of	the	most	alarming	effects	that	political	polarization	has	had.	Additionally,	as	was	stated	earlier,	another	benefit	of	this	reform	is	that	it	would	free	up	room	for	negotiation	on	other	pieces	of	legislation,	as	Congress	would	not	have	to	deal	with	any	looming	financial	shutdowns.			 Moving	to	an	evaluation	of	this	reform’s	political	viability,	it	is	my	estimation	that	this	reform	would	have	some	people	who	would	be	opposed	to	its	implementation.	I	believe	that	this	proposal	would	face	a	great	deal	of	opposition	from	the	Republican	Party.	Being	that	the	Republican	Party	is	typically	opposed	to	
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excessive	government	spending,	and	their	efforts	to	curb	government	spending	is	what	has	caused	all	of	the	debt	ceiling	crises,	Congressional	Republicans	would	likely	vehemently	oppose	the	implementation	of	this	change,	which	would	likely	lead	to	a	number	of	increases	to	the	debt	limit.	Furthermore,	this	reform	would	strike	a	blow	to	their	ability	to	forcefully	negotiate	the	federal	budget	in	future	years	as	Republicans	had	previously	used	the	debt	ceiling	as	a	negotiation	tool	when	a	Democrat	is	in	the	White	House.	All	that	being	said,	I	believe	that	this	reform	is	still	politically	viable	as	it	would	likely	have	a	great	deal	of	support	from	Democrats	as	well	as	pragmatists,	who	grasp	how	important	raising	the	debt	ceiling	is	to	the	functionality	of	America.	
Conclusion:			 A	great	deal	of	why	our	country	has	come	to	realize	that	political	polarization	has	become	a	problem	is	due	to	the	effects	it	has	had	on	Congress,	particularly	the	way	in	which	partisan	warfare	has	become	seemingly	more	important	than	legislating.	This	reality	becomes	even	more	apparent	as	we	look	at	the	ways	in	which	members	of	Congress	go	about	using	the	rules	and	procedures	of	the	body	to	aid	their	goals,	which	is	why	scholars	have	targeted	these	maneuvers	as	a	means	of	mitigating	the	effects	of	political	polarization.	Altering	the	filibuster	as	well	as	the	debt	ceiling	are	ambitious	goals	and	ones	that	would,	to	varying	degrees	of	success,	help	alleviate	the	ramifications	of	our	polarized	state.	What	neither	of	these	nor	other	government	reforms	would	do	particularly	well	is	have	an	impact	on	bridging	the	divide	between	the	two	sides	of	political	America.	I	believe	to	be	that	case	due	to	the	fact	that	although	these	types	of	reforms	would	certainly	rid	the	government	of	
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the	debilitating	effects	of	polarization,	it	would	do	nothing	to	spur	bipartisanship.	Additionally,	it	would	not	bridge	the	wide	gap	in	the	ideological	differences	between	the	two	parties.			 Though	none	of	the	reforms	discussed	are	perfect,	after	a	thorough	analysis	it	becomes	clear	that	the	reform	that	suggests	eliminating	the	debt	ceiling	is	most	worthwhile	of	pursuit.	Not	only	would	this	reform	successfully	mitigate	the	effects	of	political	polarization	on	the	process	of	raising	the	debt	ceiling,	but	also	it	would	do	so	in	a	way	that	still	allows	the	reform	to	be	politically	viable,	something	that	cannot	be	said	about	its	peers	in	this	chapter.	Although	deemed	the	most	worthy	of	pursuit	out	of	the	governmental	reforms	presented	in	this	chapter,	the	proposal	to	eliminate	the	debt	ceiling	will	likely	have	a	hard	time	stacking	up	to	other	reforms	discussed	in	its	work,	as	it	is	inherently	limited	to	alleviating	the	effects	of	political	polarization	as	opposed	to	addressing	the	issue	directly.				
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Chapter	3:	Increasing	the	Influence	of	Political	Parties	in	
Elections		 For	any	government	election,	but	particularly	elections	within	the	United	States,	the	role	of	political	parties	cannot	be	understated.	In	America,	politics	at	all	levels	is	dominated	by	two	major	parties:	Republican	and	Democratic.	The	parties	provide	a	whole	host	of	resources	to	candidates	during	campaigns,	including	money,	endorsements,	and	most	importantly	platforms	for	candidates	to	utilize	throughout	their	campaigns.	As	political	parties	are	such	an	integral	factor	in	the	running	and	outcome	of	elections,	it	should	come	as	no	surprise	that	they	have	been	a	target	for	reform,	particularly	as	scholars	have	increasingly	begun	to	wrestle	with	how	to	solve	the	problem	of	political	polarization.	This	is	especially	true	as	one	begins	to	look	at	how	the	role	of	political	parties	in	the	electoral	process	has	been	slowly	diminished	over	the	years,	something	that	will	be	discussed	later	on	in	greater	detail.		 In	recent	years,	scholars	such	as	Nathaniel	Persily	(2015)	and	Bruce	Cain	(2015)	have	argued	that	by	increasing	the	influence	of	political	parties	in	the	electoral	process,	that	America	can	address	the	issue	of	political	polarization.	In	this	chapter,	three	reforms,	put	forth	by	Persily	(2015)	and	Cain	(2015)	will	be	discussed,	all	of	which	aim	to	increase	the	influence	of	political	parties	in	the	electoral	process.	The	three	reforms	are	as	follows:	enable	political	parties	to	endorse	candidates	on	the	ballot,	a	proposal	to	allow	political	parties	to	determine	who	may	run	on	the	party’s	line,	and	finally	a	reform	that	suggests	altering	the	campaign	finance	system	to	strengthen	the	financial	capabilities	of	the	political	
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parties.	Both	Persily	(2015)	and	Cain	(2015)	argue	that	the	implementation	of	these	three	reforms	will	lead	to	a	decrease	in	the	levels	of	political	polarization.			 As	each	reform	is	discussed,	the	same	guiding	questions	will	be	answered.	Those	questions	are:	what	is	the	reform?	What	is	the	problem	that	the	reform	addresses?	How	is	that	reform	related	to	political	polarization?	How	does	the	reform	address	political	polarization?	And,	what	is	the	political	viability	of	the	reform?	Using	the	answers	to	these	questions	as	a	guide,	this	chapter	aims	to	determine	which	of	the	reforms	is	most	worthwhile	of	pursuit	out	of	the	three	discussed	in	this	chapter.			The	Role	of	Political	Parties	Over	the	Years		 Before	moving	on	to	examine	each	of	the	reforms	it	is	important	that	role	of	political	parties	have	played	in	the	electoral	process	over	the	years	is	explained	in	greater	detail.	Doing	so	not	only	contextualizes	the	modern	role	of	political	parties	in	elections	but	also	illustrates	why	these	three	specific	reforms	have	been	put	forth	by	Persily	(2015)	and	Cain	(2015).			 For	the	majority	of	America’s	existence,	political	parties	held	a	great	deal	of	control	over	the	electoral	process.	As	noted	in	the	book	Campaign	and	Elections	(Sides,	et	al.	2015),	up	until	the	1968	presidential	election,	nearly	every	general	election	candidate	from	both	the	Democratic	and	Republican	parties	was	chosen	not	directly	by	the	people,	but	instead	through	backroom	dealings	among	party	leaders.	The	primary	election	process	of	1898	or	even	1956	looked	nothing	like	the	one	we	have	today	where	millions	cast	their	ballots	to	determine	who	represents	their	affiliated	party.	The	backroom	dealings	often	led	to	the	nomination	of	more	
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establishment	candidates,	which	began	to	upset	the	primary	voters	of	both	parties.	For	example,	the	1968	Democratic	convention	selected	then	Vice-President	Hubert	Humphrey	as	its	nominee,	although	he	had	not	participated	in	any	of	the	primary	contested	held	in	that	cycle.	The	influence	of	political	parties	in	elections	was	not	limited	to	the	presidential	races,	but	in	fact	was	even	more	important	at	the	congressional,	state	and	local	levels	of	government.	In	those	races,	local	party	bosses	often	unilaterally	decided	who	would	be	allowed	to	become	a	candidate	for	office,	and	even	were	able	to	push	other	candidates	out	of	the	race	in	order	to	create	an	unopposed	election.	Nowadays,	we	know	that	the	reach	of	political	parties	is	far	more	subdued,	as	both	parties	allow	the	voters	to	choose	who	represents	them	in	elections	at	all	levels	of	government.			 In	addition	to	the	shift	in	control	of	candidate	selection	away	from	political	parties,	there	has	also	been	a	great	deal	of	change	over	the	years	in	the	financial	role	of	the	political	parties	in	elections.		Robert	Mutch	(2016	,6)	highlights	the	present	role	of	political	parties	in	the	financing	of	campaigns,	writing,	“party	money	only	accounts	for	a	small	share	of	most	candidates’	campaign	funds.	In	2012,	party	money	made	up	only	1	percent	of	House	candidates’	receipts	and	3	percent	of	Senate	candidates’	seats.”	While	the	amount	of	party	money	going	towards	individual	campaigns	has	always	been	relatively	minuscule	amount	compared	to	total	spending	figures,	the	real	change	in	the	political	parties’	role	in	campaign	finance	has	come	as	a	result	of	the	elimination	of	“soft	money”	and	the	creation	of	Super	PACs.		
		 48	
	 The	elimination	of	“soft	money”	came	as	a	result	of	the	2002	Bipartisan	Campaign	Reform	Act	(BCRA).	The	BCRA	“prohibits	national	party	committees	and	federal	candidates	from	raising	and	spending	nonfederal	money,”	(Mutch	2016,	158).	Prior	to	the	BCRA	passing	Congress,	crafty	donors	and	campaigns	utilized	the	political	parties	to	channel	additional	financial	resources	to	campaigns.	The	political	parties	did	so	by	using	state	funds	to	pay	for	party-building	activities,	such	as	registering	voters,	yard	signs,	and	other	grass-roots	activities,	that	provided	a	benefit	to	federal	candidates	and	campaigns	as	well.	Prior	to	2002,	the	political	parties	provided	a	crucial	source	of	financial	resources	to	federal	campaigns	in	the	form	of	“soft	money”,	something	that	increased	their	influence	of	candidates,	campaigns,	and	donors	alike.	The	elimination	of	“soft	money”	was	just	one	way	in	which	the	political	parties’	role	in	campaign	finance	has	been	diminished	over	time.			 The	second	way	in	which	the	role	that	political	parties	play	in	campaign	finance	has	been	diminished	is	through	the	creation	of	Super	PACs.	After	the	Citizens	
United	ruling,	the	creation	of	Super	PACs	led	to	an	influx	of	donations	from	wealthy	individuals	as	well	as	corporations.	This	new	form	of	outside	expenditure	not	only	increased	the	amount	of	money	spent	on	elections	but	also	diminished	the	importance	of	party	money.	After	the	creation	of	Super	PACs,	it	was	more	beneficial	for	individuals	to	contribute	to	those	committees,	given	the	lack	of	contribution	limits,	than	it	was	to	donate	to	a	political	party	directly.	Thus,	after	already	having	the	influence	of	“soft	money”	stripped	from	them,	the	political	parties	were	dealt	another	blow	to	the	financial	importance	after	the	creation	of	Super	PACs,	as	both	donors	became	invested	in	the	new,	limitless,	form	of	contributing.	
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Reform:	Allow	Political	Parties	to	Determine	Who	May	Run	on	
Party	Line			 Often	in	a	primary	election,	voters	and	political	pundits	are	left	wondering	why	a	candidate	would	choose	to	run	on	a	party	line	that	they	typically	are	not	affiliated.	For	example,	Sen.	Bernie	Sanders,	who	in	his	political	life	never	had	designated	himself	as	a	member	of	the	Democratic	Party,	ran	for	that	party’s	nomination	during	the	2016	Democratic	primary	contest.	What	Persily’s	(2015)	proposal	would	do	is	it	would	allow	political	parties	to	determine	who	is	allowed	to	run	in	their	party’s	primary	contest.	Under	this	reform,	the	political	parties	would	have	to	approve	all	individual’s	requests	to	run	for	office,	regardless	of	whether	or	not	the	individual	is	a	member	of	that	party	at	the	time	of	the	election.	This	would	be	a	dramatic	shift	from	the	present	situation	by	which	anyone	has	permission	to	run	on	any	party	line	they	see	fit	as	long	as	they	meet	petitioning	requirements.	By	enacting	this	reform,	the	political	parties	would	immediately	control	who	is	able	to	run	on	party	lines,	something	that	as	stated	earlier,	is	very	important	in	terms	of	candidate	viability.			 The	problem	that	this	reform	aims	to	address	is	that	there	are	far	too	many	ideologically	extreme	candidates	running	for	office	today.	Given	that	anyone	can	run	for	elected	office	and	that	currently	there	are	very	few	restrictions	preventing	any	individual	from	running	for	a	party’s	nomination	it	is	no	surprise	that	we	have	seen	ideologically	extreme	candidates	from	both	the	far	left	and	far	right	run	for	office.	Ideologically	extreme	candidates	on	both	sides	have	in	the	past	shifted	the	nature	of	discussion	in	a	campaign,	which	has	forced	more	moderate	candidates	to	shift	their	positions	to	compete.		In	that	sense,	not	only	has	the	presence	of	ideologically	
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extreme	candidates	led	to	more	of	those	individuals	being	elected	to	office	but	also	their	mere	presence,	regardless	of	their	viability,	alters	the	nature	of	the	campaign	and	can	have	lasting	political	implications.	Thusly,	the	implementation	of	this	reform	would	enable	both	parties	to	possess	the	ability	to	prevent	future	instances	of	ideologically	extreme	candidates	wrecking	havoc	on	primary	elections,	or	even	possibly	lower	the	number	of	ideologically	extreme	candidates	who	win.			 In	looking	at	how	the	problem	of	a	large	number	of	ideologically	extreme	candidates	running	for	office,	which	this	reform	aims	to	solve,	is	related	to	political	polarization,	the	connection	is	relatively	clear.	As	more	ideologically	extreme	candidates	run	for	office	not	only	is	there	a	greater	likelihood	those	individuals	might	win	their	contests,	but	the	likelihood	that	in	a	primary	election	they	drag	their	more	moderate	opponents	to	the	left	or	right	also	increases.	This	directly	affects	the	levels	of	political	polarization	in	government,	as	these	ideologically	extreme	individuals	are	the	ones	who	are	becoming	members	of	Congress.	One	only	needs	to	look	at	the	role	that	fringe	conservative	candidates	had	on	the	general	election	viability	of	Mitt	Romney,	who	was	damaged	by	his	“self-deportation”	and	abortion	remarks	which	were	made	to	compete	with	his	more	fringe	but	less	viable	opponents.	Individuals	like	Herman	Cain,	Rick	Santorum,	Rick	Perry,	and	Michele	Bachman	helped	shape	the	rhetoric	that	framed	the	2012	Republican	primary	election,	even	though	none	of	them	even	won	a	single	primary	contest	(New	York	Times	2012).	Without	having	to	know	a	great	deal	about	the	way	America’s	federal	government	operates,	it	is	clear	that	the	problem	that	Persily’s	(2015)	reform	aims	to	solve,	which	is	the	large	number	of	ideologically	extreme	individuals	running	for	
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office,	is	a	problem	that	directly	relates	to	the	levels	of	political	polarization,	as	the	individuals	elected	to	Congress	are	composed	entirely	of	those	who	choose	to	run	for	office.		 The	next	question	then	is	whether	or	not	the	proposal	to	allow	political	parties	to	determine	who	may	run	on	party	lines	would	be	able	to	affect	political	polarization.	In	my	estimation,	this	reform	would	only	minimally	affect	political	polarization	in	America.	My	reasoning	stems	from	one	main	fact,	which	that	many	of	the	state	political	parties	are	far	more	conservative	or	liberal	than	their	corresponding	national	parties.	To	illustrate	this,	I	looked	at	the	research	conducted	by	Jeffrey	Jones	(2015),	which	analyzes	which	states	favor	which	party	politically.	During	the	course	of	his	analysis,	Jones	(2015)	notes	that	Massachusetts	and	Maryland	are	the	states	that	favor	the	Democratic	Party	the	most,	while	Wyoming	and	Utah	are	the	two	states	that	favor	the	Republican	Party	the	most.	In	Massachusetts	and	Maryland,	the	support	for	the	Democratic	Party	is	very	high	and	thus	the	Maryland	or	Massachusetts	State	Democratic	Party	are	likely	comprised	individuals	who	are	equally	as	liberal	as	their	peers	in	the	respective	states.	As	a	result,	if	this	reform	were	to	be	enacted	the	state	Democratic	Parties	in	both	Maryland	and	Massachusetts	are	likely	to	allow	ideologically	far	left	individuals	to	run	for	office.	The	same	can	be	said	about	Utah	or	Wyoming,	where	after	the	inaction	of	this	reform,	state	party	leaders	are	likely	to	continue	to	allow	ideologically	far	right	individuals	to	run	for	office.	Thus,	given	the	various	political	leanings	of	all	50	states,	the	only	true	moderating	effect	that	this	reform	would	have	
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comes	in	the	form	of	the	national	parties,	which	could	permit	or	deny	candidates	for	presidential	elections.			 	That	being	said,	another	likely	result	of	the	inaction	of	this	reform	should	be	evaluated	to	determine	whether	or	not	Persily’s	(2015)	reform	affects	political	polarization.	This	opportunity	to	affect	political	polarization	stems	from	the	fact	that	the	implementation	of	this	reform	would	likely	boost	the	credibility	and	viability	of	third	parties.	As	candidates	that	would	have	initially	run	on	one	of	the	two	major	party	lines	are	unable	to	gain	the	permission	to	do	so,	they	would	have	to	campaign	on	a	different	party	platform,	thus	increasing	the	number	of	elections	with	third	party	candidates.	Russell	Dalton	(2008)	studied	the	effect	of	third	parties	on	political	polarization	and	discovered,	that	in	fact	it	was	not	the	sheer	number	of	parties	that	affects	the	levels	of	political	polarization	but	instead	the	competitiveness	of	those	additional	parties.	Taking	Dalton’s	(2008)	work	into	account,	there	is	no	guarantee	that	although	third	parties	may	see	an	uptick	in	the	number	individuals	running	on	their	platforms	that	those	parties	would	be	any	more	competitive	than	they	are	today.	Therefore,	I	believe	that	it	is	unlikely	that	any	positive	effect	on	political	polarization	will	arise	as	a	result	of	this	byproduct	of	Persily’s	(2015)	reform.		 Moving	on	to	a	discussion	of	the	political	viability	of	the	proposed	reform	to	allow	political	parties	to	determine	who	may	run	on	party	lines,	it	is	clear	that	this	proposal	is	quite	controversial.	The	two	major	political	parties	themselves	would	not	necessarily	oppose	enacting	this	reform,	but	it	is	my	estimation	that	groups	aiming	to	preserve	the	importance	of	democracy	as	well	as	those	who	aim	to	ensure	
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the	freedom	of	elections	would	definitely	take	qualm	with	this	reform.	Furthermore,	as	this	reform	would	openly	promote	the	blocking	of	access	to	elected	office,	it	would	likely	not	receive	widespread	support	from	the	general	public	and	thus	elected	officials,	who	would	feel	the	immense	pressure	to	side	with	their	constituents.	Another	question	that	arises	when	discussing	the	political	viability	of	this	reform	is	whether	or	not	the	reform	itself	is	constitutional.	Given	that	the	reform	limits	access	to	elected	office,	in	my	opinion,	there	would	certainly	be	legal	efforts	made	in	opposition	to	this	reform.	Based	on	these	two	factors	it	is	my	estimation	that	these	reforms	are	not	viable	in	the	present	day	political	climate.		
Reform:	Enable	Political	Parties	to	“Endorse”	Candidates	on	
the	Ballot		 As	is	often	the	case,	primary	elections	consist	of	multiple	candidates	who	are	all	vying	for	their	party’s	nomination	and	a	general	election	contest.	Currently,	the	local,	state	or	national	party	is	intended	to	be	a	non-participant	and	simply	adjudicate	any	issues	with	the	race	itself.	As	a	result,	the	parties	cannot	sway	the	nature	of	the	election	in	the	favor	of	one	candidate	or	another.	The	reform	that	enables	political	parties	to	endorse	candidates	on	the	ballot	aims	to	change	all	that	by	enabling	political	parties	to	play	favorites	in	elections.	Under	this	reform,	parties	would	be	free	to	choose	one	of	the	candidates	running	in	a	given	primary	election	and	endorse	them.	Furthermore,	that	endorsement	would	be	indicated	on	the	physical	ballot	for	the	primary	election,	providing	voters	with	an	additional	reminder	as	to	whom	the	local,	state	or	national	party	supports	in	that	race.	This	proposal	would	not	only	remove	the	notion	that	political	parties	are	non-
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participants	in	primary	elections,	but	would	also	have	a	tremendous	impact	on	the	outcome	of	elections.		 The	problem	that	enabling	political	parties	to	endorse	candidates	on	the	ballot	aims	to	solve	is	again	directly	related	to	the	problem	of	the	viability	of	ideologically	extreme	candidates.	As	was	mentioned	earlier,	ideologically	extreme	candidates	not	only	pose	a	threat	in	the	sense	that	those	individuals	might	win	their	elections	and	enter	government,	but	also	that	they	have	the	ability	to	shape	the	discussion	in	a	campaign	cycle.	This	reality	is	aided	by	the	fact	that	political	parties	are	meant	to	stay	on	the	sidelines	during	primary	elections,	and	therefore	cannot	openly	take	actions	or	stances	that	favor	one	candidate	over	another.	By	eliminating	this	invisible	political	barrier,	political	parties	would	directly	affect	this	problem,	as	voters	would	not	have	an	indication	of	whom	their	local,	state	or	national	party	views	as	the	best	candidate.	Parties	would	now	be	allowed	to	urge	people	to	support	their	ideal	candidate,	something	that	would	have	a	tremendous	effect	on	the	outcomes	of	elections	nationwide.	Although	this	reform	would	not	entirely	eliminate	the	problem	of	ideologically	extreme	candidates,	it	would	likely	have	a	positive	impact	on	reducing	those	individual’s	political	influence.		 Revisiting	the	connection	between	ideologically	extreme	candidates	and	the	levels	of	political	polarization,	there	is	a	clear	relationship	between	the	two.	The	main	impact	that	ideologically	extreme	candidates	have	on	political	polarization	occurs	when	those	candidates	win	elections	and	enter	into	government.	The	influx	of	ideologically	extreme	candidates	on	both	the	left	and	the	right	would	almost	certainly	further	the	ideological	gap	between	the	two	parties.	Furthermore,	as	the	
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ideological	divide	in	government	increases,	the	likelihood	that	bipartisan	action	will	be	taken	decreases.	To	illustrate	that	point	I	combined	the	data	collected	by	DeSilver	(2014)	on	the	ideological	overlap	in	Congress	with	the	data	collected	by	Congressional	Quarterly	(2014)	on	bipartisan	voting	behavior	in	Congress.	DeSilver	(2014)	notes	that	in	1973-1974	there	were	240	members	of	the	House	and	29	members	of	the	Senate	that	had	ideological	overlap	with	members	of	another	party.	CQ	(2014)	shows	that	in	1974	29	percent	of	House	votes	and	44	percent	of	Senate	votes	were	“party	unity	votes”	meaning	that	a	majority	of	voting	Democrats	opposed	a	majority	of	voting	Republicans.	Moving	ahead	to	the	21st	Century,	DeSilver	(2014)	points	out	that	by	the	2011-2012	session	of	Congress	there	was	no	ideological	overlap	in	either	chamber,	while	CQ	(2014)	notes	that	73	percent	of	all	House	votes	and	60	percent	of	all	Senate	votes	were	“party	unity	votes”.	Combining	these	two	sets	of	data	illustrates	the	impact	of	a	growing	ideological	divide	in	Congress	on	bipartisan	behavior.	Aside	from	the	impact	that	ideologically	extreme	candidates	have	on	the	makeup	of	government,	it	is	clear	that	their	presence	affects	political	polarization	by	impacting	bipartisanship	and	the	overall	nature	of	campaigns.		 Moving	on	to	an	analysis	of	how	enabling	political	parties	to	endorse	candidates	on	the	ballot	would	affect	political	polarization,	it	is	important	to	first	understand	the	logic	behind	the	proposal	before	moving	on	to	an	examination	of	its	effectiveness.	The	thought	behind	this	reform	is	that	by	enabling	political	parties	to	endorse	candidates,	many	voters	will	follow	the	party’s	lead	and	vote	for	the	selected	candidate.	Furthermore,	this	reform	relies	heavily	on	the	fact	that	the	
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political	parties,	once	allowed	to	endorse	candidates,	would	primarily	endorse	more	moderate	candidates.	Revisiting	the	data	collected	by	Jones	(2015)	it	becomes	clear	that	in	fact,	state	parties	across	the	country	differ	in	their	ideological	leanings,	in	the	sense	that	they	reflect	how	liberal,	conservative	or	moderate	their	particular	state	is.	The	implication	for	this	reform	is	that	its	intended	effects	would	not	actually	come	to	fruition,	as	instead	of	endorsing	moderate	candidates	in	primary	elections,	many	state	parties	will	select	more	ideologically	extreme	candidates	that	mirror	that	state’s	ideological	composition.	Jones’	(2015)	research	leads	me	to	believe	that	in	states	like	Massachusetts	and	Maryland,	the	state	Democratic	parties	are	more	inclined	to	endorse	a	progressive	Democrat	than	a	moderate	Democrat,	as	their	state’s	population	is	particularly	liberal.	Similarly,	I	believe	that	more	conservative	states	like	Utah	and	Wyoming	will	see	their	state	Republican	parties	endorsing	more	conservative	candidates	over	moderate	ones.	Based	on	this	reality,	it	is	my	estimation	that	this	reform	will	likely	only	minimally	affect	political	polarization.			 Looking	at	the	political	viability	of	the	proposal	to	enable	political	parties	to	endorse	candidates	on	the	ballot,	it	is	my	estimation	that	this	reform	is	somewhat	viable.	This	conclusion	stems	from	the	fact	that	although	many	would	oppose	to	grant	political	parties	this	power,	the	reform	itself	would	not	face	any	significant	opposition	from	either	political	party.	In	theory,	both	parties	would	likely	support	the	implementation	of	this	reform,	as	it	would	tremendously	increase	their	reach	in	elections	at	all	levels	of	government.	Furthermore,	even	though	this	reform	would	not	necessarily	lead	to	a	reduction	in	the	number	of	ideologically	extreme	candidates,	what	it	would	likely	do	is	increase	the	number	of	winning	candidates	
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who	are	the	preferred	candidates	of	either	the	local,	state	or	national	party.		That	being	said,	I	believe	that	in	reality	there	would	be	some	intra-party	conflict	over	supporting	this	reform,	which	would	stem	from	the	various	political	wings	of	the	two	parties.	For	example,	the	Tea	Party	wing	of	the	Republican	Party	would	likely	have	a	different	preferred	candidate	than	the	establishment	wing	of	the	Republican	Party,	which	holds	most	of	the	leadership	roles	today.	The	same	would	be	true	about	the	progressive	wing	of	the	Democratic	Party,	which	although	influential,	does	not	hold	the	same	weight	as	the	establishment	wing	of	the	party.	For	those	reasons,	the	far	left	and	far	right	might	oppose	this	reform	given	that	it	has	the	potential	to	harm	the	viability	of	their	preferred	candidates.	In	my	mind,	though,	this	conflict	would	cease	to	exist	of	the	reform	were	to	be	implemented	on	the	basis	that	the	state	parties	control	the	endorsement	process	for	congressional	elections,	while	the	national	party	simply	controls	the	process	for	presidential	elections.	By	implementing	the	reform	in	that	way	the	various	ideological	wings	of	the	two	parties	would	still	maintain	some	control	and	influence	over	the	endorsement	process.	All	of	that	said,	the	proposal	to	allow	political	parties	to	endorse	candidates	on	the	ballot	would	not	have	the	smoothest	road	to	existence.		
Reform:	Altering	the	Campaign	Finance	System	to	Strengthen	
Political	Parties		 With	the	rise	of	Super	PACs	after	the	Citizens	United	ruling,	many	in	American	have	begun	to	question	the	role	that	money	plays	in	elections.	The	increased	role	of	independent	expenditures,	as	was	stated	earlier,	has	had	a	detrimental	impact	on	the	influence	of	political	parties	in	the	financing	of	elections.	This	reform	would	overhaul	the	campaign	finance	system	as	we	know	it,	by	eliminating	Super	PACs	and	
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instead	enabling	the	unlimited	donation	of	funds	to	national	political	parties	instead.	Doing	so	would	create	an	influx	of	funds	to	political	parties	at	the	state,	local	and	national	level	and	would	dramatically	increase	the	financial	reach	and	capabilities	of	both	parties	at	all	levels	of	government.			 The	problem	that	this	reform	aims	to	solve	is	that	independent	expenditures	have	led	to	the	increased	viability	of	ideologically	extreme	political	candidates	and	campaigns.	While	Super	PACs	and	other	independent	actors	are	primarily	involved	in	presidential	elections,	their	existence	has	impacted	the	importance	of	political	party	contributions.	Thus,	by	eliminating	Super	PACs	and	extending	the	unlimited	contribution	clause	to	political	parties,	hundreds	of	millions	of	dollars	would	be	funneled	into	political	parties,	which	could	then	provide	resources	to	hundreds	of	races	across	the	country.	The	hope	is	that	by	implementing	this	change,	the	resources	would	be	directed	to	more	moderate	candidates	and	this	notion	will	be	evaluated	later	on.			 Like	the	two	previous	reforms	discussed	in	this	chapter,	this	proposed	alteration	to	campaign	finance	rules	aims	to	solve	a	problem	that	is	directly	connected	to	political	polarization	by	addressing	the	viability	of	ideologically	extreme	candidates.	By	funneling	financial	resources	away	from	Super	PACs	and	into	political	parties	far	more	resources	would	be	available	to	take	down	those	ideologically	extreme	candidates,	thus	lowering	the	likelihood	they	win	their	primary	contests.	As	has	been	stated	numerous	times	throughout	this	chapter,	the	levels	of	political	polarization	in	government	are	directly	tied	to	the	individuals	who	are	elected	to	government.	Therefore	by	weakening	the	odds	of	extreme	candidates	
		 59	
winning	primary	contests,	America	would	see	a	direct	impact	on	the	trend	of	political	polarization.		 Moving	on	to	a	discussion	of	how	this	proposed	reform	would	affect	political	polarization,	it	is	again	important	to	first	discuss	the	logic	behind	the	reform	and	then	evaluate	the	reform	for	its	effectiveness.	The	thought	behind	this	reform	is	that	by	eliminating	Super	PACs	while	at	the	same	time	enabling	unlimited	contributions	to	national	political	parties,	an	influx	of	funds	would	be	received	by	political	parties,	which	would	then	be	dispersed	to	races	across	the	country.	Where	this	reform	seeks	to	affect	political	polarization	is	through	the	assumption	that	the	national	political	party	is	more	likely	to	support	candidates	that	are	moderate	over	ideologically	extreme	candidates.	Furthermore,	the	elimination	of	Super	PACs	would	directly	affect	the	political	viability	of	ideologically	extreme	individuals	running	for	president.	Individuals	like	Rick	Santorum,	Newt	Gingrich	who	in	the	past	have	relied	upon	one	mega-wealthy	donor	financing	a	Super	PAC,	would	no	longer	be	able	to	rely	on	that	source	of	financial	support.	In	theory,	these	proposed	campaign	finance	changes	have	the	potential	to	address	the	issue	of	political	polarization	by	reducing	the	viability	of	ideologically	extreme	candidates;	the	question	now	is	whether	or	not	these	political	notions	match	reality.		 Dealing	first	with	the	implications	for	the	presidential	nominating	processes,	I	believe	that	the	elimination	of	Super	PACs	would	be	successful	in	limiting	the	viability	of	ideologically	extreme	candidates,	particularly	on	the	Republican	side.	Without	the	financial	resources	that	Super	PACs	provide,	many	of	the	candidacies	mentioned	earlier	would	have	failed	to	get	off	the	ground,	and	without	them,	
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ideologically	extreme	individuals	are	unlikely	to	receive	the	financial	backing	of	the	national	party.	That	is	the	case	as	for	the	presidential	election	as	the	national	party	is	typically	concerned	with	having	a	more	moderate,	establishment	candidate	represent	the	party	in	the	general	election.	National	parties	prefer	moderate	candidates	for	a	general	election,	as	they	will	be	in	a	direct	competition	with	the	opposing	party	for	undecided	and	independent	voters	who	tend	to	be	more	moderate	in	the	ideological	views.	Without	those	financial	resources,	the	likelihood	that	ideologically	extreme	candidates	would	be	able	to	secure	their	party’s	nomination	is	significantly	hampered.	Thus,	it	is	my	estimation	that	this	aspect	of	the	proposed	reform	to	alter	campaign	finance	rules	would	be	successful	in	affecting	political	polarization.			 Next,	it	is	important	to	determine	whether	or	not	the	same	would	be	true	for	congressional	races.	As	I	have	noted	repeatedly	throughout	this	chapter,	the	work	done	by	Jones	(2015)	illustrates	the	differences	in	ideological	leanings	across	individual	states.	The	implication	of	this	reality	on	the	proposal	to	alter	campaign	finance	rules	is	that	in	all	likelihood	the	national	party	would	direct	financial	resources	to	candidates	that	are	most	likely	to	win	the	general	election	in	a	given	race.	Acknowledging	that	both	parties’	aim	is	to	secure	a	governing	majority,	it	is	my	estimation	that	ideological	leanings	would	be	cast	aside	by	the	national	parties	and	instead	those	organizations	would	funnel	money	to	candidates	that	have	the	greatest	chance	of	winning,	regardless	of	whether	or	not	they	are	on	the	far	left	or	far	right.	Keeping	that	in	mind,	it	is	my	opinion	that	although	this	reform	is	capable	of	addressing	the	number	of	ideologically	extreme	candidates	at	the	presidential	
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level,	it	is	unable	to	affect	the	congressional	level	and	thus	its	overall	ability	to	affect	political	polarization	is	severely	limited.			 In	looking	at	the	political	viability	of	these	proposed	campaign	finance	rule	changes,	it	is	clear	that	this	reform	faces	one	major	obstacle.	The	major	roadblock	is	that	the	alteration	of	campaign	finance	laws	would	require	a	change	to	the	Citizens	
United	ruling,	which	currently	enables	the	existence	of	Super	PACs.	As	a	result,	this	reform	would	not	only	face	political	obstacles	but	even	before	this	reform	could	reach	that	stage	there	would	need	to	be	massive	legal	upheaval.	Leaving	prospective	legal	battles	aside,	it	is	my	estimation	that	this	proposal	would	face	opposition	from	the	Democrats	in	government.	Democrats	have	been	strong	opponents	of	unlimited	political	contributions	and	would	likely	not	support	any	extension	of	an	individual’s	or	corporation’s	right	to	give	endlessly	to	political	parties.	Keeping	that	in	mind,	I	believe	that	Democrats	would	utilize	all	their	resources	to	oppose	this	reform,	adding	a	second	roadblock	to	the	successful	implementation	of	this	reform.	Given	the	presence	of	two	daunting	obstacles,	it	is	my	estimation	that	the	political	viability	of	the	proposal	to	eliminate	Super	PACs	and	instead	allow	unlimited	contributions	to	political	parties	is	quite	low.		
Conclusion:		 By	effectively	allowing	political	parties	to	put	their	thumbs	on	the	electoral	scale,	America	would	have	to	question	the	current	electoral	system	and	balance	in	place,	which	is	a	debate	that	would	rage	almost	surely	for	eternity.	The	question	our	country	must	then	deal	with	is	whether	or	not	strengthening	political	parties	is	the	proper	way	to	guide	our	country	out	a	politically	divided	time.	Out	of	the	three	
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reforms	discussed	in	this	chapter,	it	is	my	estimation	that	the	third	reform	discussed,	which	is	the	proposal	to	eliminate	Super	PACs	and	instead	permit	unlimited	contributions	to	political	parties	is	the	most	worthwhile	of	pursuit.	This	conclusion	does	not	stem	from	my	belief	that	this	reform	itself	is	exceptional,	but	instead	is	derived	from	the	fact	that	the	other	two	reforms	discussed	in	this	chapter	were	deemed	to	be	politically	unviable	and	also	unable	to	affect	political	polarization.	In	fact,	based	on	the	evidence	presented,	it	is	my	belief	that	political	parties	as	an	entity	are	the	entirely	wrong	vessel	to	deliver	a	remedy	to	political	polarization.			 	
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Chapter	4:	Electorate	Reforms			 Another	area	that	scholars	have	studied	as	a	potential	source	for	alleviating	political	polarization	in	America	is	the	American	electorate.	Given	the	nature	of	American	democracy,	it	is	quite	apparent	how	important	the	electorate	is	in	any	election.	Given	that	the	voting	public	are	the	ones	who	are	actually	responsible	for	selecting	the	elected	officials,	scholars	have	begun	to	focus	on	ways	to	improve	the	quality	of	information	accessible	to	voters,	something	that	has	become	increasingly	important	as	the	levels	of	polarization	has	risen	over	the	years.	In	part,	this	increased	focus	has	been	derived	from	the	fact	that	the	quality	and	quantity	of	non-partisan	information	is	scarce.	Additionally,	as	scholars	are	constantly	studying	the	voter	decision-making	process,	the	importance	of	the	how	candidate	information	and	campaign	new	coverage	affects	individual’s	voter	decision-making	process	remains	key.		 In	particular	scholars	such	as	Adam	Bonica	(2015)	and	Markus	Prior	and	Natalie	Stroud	(2015)	have	argued	that	voters	should	be	provided	with	high	quality,	non-partisan	information	in	elections	in	the	form	of	a	voter’s	guide.	These	scholars	believe	that	it	is	important	to	not	only	create	a	more	knowledgeable	electorate	but	also	a	more	open-minded	electorate.	This	reform	would	address	the	issue	of	partisan	news	bubbles,	something	that	has	become	increasingly	worse	and	dangerous	with	the	development	of	cable	news	networks	such	as	MSNBC	and	Fox	News.	A	second	reform,	that	works	closely	off	the	nature	of	what	has	been	proposed	by	Bonica	(2015)	and	Prior	and	Stroud	(2015)	addresses	the	issue	of	news	coverage	during	an	election.	Their	proposal	aims	to	reform	what	sort	of	content	is	covered	by	
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the	major	news	outlets,	thus	influencing	what	information	is	put	before	the	American	public.	The	goal	of	this	reform	would	be	to	push	major	news	sources	to	focus	their	coverage	on	more	substantive	content,	replacing	the	peripheral	coverage	that	is	disseminated	today.	The	goal	of	this	chapter,	as	is	the	goal	of	every	chapter,	is	to	analyze	reforms	that	address	these	concerns	to	determine	if	they	would	be	worthwhile	in	pursuing	in	the	fight	to	reduce	political	polarization.			 For	each	reform	discussed,	the	following	questions	will	be	answered:	what	is	the	reform?	What	is	the	problem	that	the	reform	addresses?	How	is	this	problem	related	to	polarization?	And	finally,	what	is	the	political	viability	of	this	reform?			
Reform:	Providing	Non-Partisan	Candidate	Information	to	
Voters		 		 A	push	to	provide	non-partisan	electoral	information	to	voters	could	come	in	the	form	of	hundreds	of	different	vessels.	Thus,	it	is	important	to	be	specific	with	both	what	kind	of	data	would	be	provided	to	voters	and	in	what	form	and	platforms	that	data	would	be	provided.	In	terms	of	what	information	would	be	provided	to	voters,	the	question	arises	of	what	would	most	likely	lead	voters	to	choose	less	ideologically	extreme	or	polarized	candidates.	Both	Bonica	(2015)	and	Prior	and	Stroud	(2015)	suggest	that	information	on	candidates’	ideological	scores	as	well	as	their	policy	platforms	are	most	important	in	terms	of	informing	voter	decision-making.	I	tend	to	agree	with	their	selection	in	this	regard	as	placing	candidates	on	an	easily	interpreted	ideological	chart	would	enable	voters	to	clearly	compare	the	ideologies	of	candidates	in	the	race.	Additionally,	as	many	policy	positions	and	proposals	often	receive	less	attention	during	the	campaign,	the	suggestion	to	
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include	a	brief	description	of	the	implications	of	the	policies	proposed	by	a	candidate,	of	course,	provided	by	an	independent	non-partisan	expert,	would	allow	the	voters	to	see	how	each	proposal	would	affect	their	lives.	Currently,	such	information	exists,	but	it	is	not	common	nor	easily	accessible	as	it’s	not	located	in	one	central	location	and	thus	many	voters	often	to	do	come	across	it.	If	properly	promoted	and	disseminated,	this	voter’s	guide	would	provide	all	Americans	will	a	common,	trusted	sources	of	non-partisan	political	information,	which	could	then	be	factored	into	the	decision-making	process	of	voters	across	the	country.			 Many	would	ask,	why	is	it	necessary	to	increase	the	quality	and	level	of	information	provided	to	voters	as	we	live	in	the	most	information	accessible	era	in	the	history	of	society.	The	reality	is	that	although	there	is	a	great	deal	of	new	sources,	many	of	them	cater	to	a	particular	ideological	viewpoint,	which	can	lead	to	individuals	only	being	exposed	to	news	that	reinforces	their	own	views.	Furthermore,	as	the	number	of	news	networks	catering	to	a	particular	political	viewpoint	has	increased,	so	too	has	the	degree	to	which	users	have	drawn	upon	those	sorts	of	networks	for	their	news	as	it	fits	their	political	bubbles.	Looking	at	a	study	conducted	by	Jeffrey	Gottfried,	Michael	Barthel,	and	Amy	Mitchell	(2017)	of	the	Pew	Research	Center,	the	partisan	news	networks,	and	social	media	feeds	dominated	the	news	coverage	in	the	2016	election.	According	to	the	study,	19	percent	of	all	voters	cited	Fox	News	as	their	main	source	for	news	about	the	2016	election,	13	percent	cited	CNN	and	8	percent	cited	Facebook.	Additionally,	7	percent	of	all	voters	indicated	that	the	“local	news”	was	the	primary	sources	of	campaign	news,	while	both	NBC	and	ABC	received	5	percent	and	CBS	received	4	percent	of	
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respondents.	Looking	at	Clinton	and	Trump	voters,	40	percent	of	Trump	voters	surveyed	indicated	that	Fox	News	was	their	main	sources	of	campaign	coverage,	while	CNN	was	the	top	coverage	source	for	Clinton	voters	with	18	percent.	MSNBC,	which	is	largely	considered	to	be	the	liberal	counterpart	to	Fox	News,	was	5	percent	of	all	respondent’s	choice	and	9	percent	of	Clinton	voters.	Interpreting	their	data	I	gather	that	regardless	of	partisan	affiliation	a	sizable	portion	of	the	population	relied	on	sources	that	tend	to	be	biased	in	their	coverage.	Voters	who	only	are	exposed	to	partisan	information	are	likely	to	act	upon	that	information	when	making	a	decision	on	whom	to	vote	for	in	an	election.	Looking	at	the	trends	in	partisan	news	consumption	by	utilizing	the	data	collected	by	the	Pew	Research	Center	(2009),	we	can	see	there	is	a	relationship	between	the	levels	of	political	polarization	and	the	viewership	of	partisan	news	networks.	In	1998	only	14	percent	of	Republicans	said	they	watched	Fox	News	regularly,	compared	to	36	percent	in	2008.	The	rise	of	Fox	News	amongst	Republicans	also	meant	a	decrease	of	CNN	viewership	by	Republicans	as	in	1998	25	percent	indicated	they	watched	CNN	frequently,	compared	to	only	17	percent	in	2008.	Looking	at	the	trends	in	Democrats’	viewing	habits,	collected	by	the	same	Pew	Research	Center	(2009)	study,	both	MSNBC	and	CNN	increased	in	viewership	over	the	ten-year	period,	with	MSNBC	going	from	10	to	18	percent	of	respondents	and	CNN	going	from	25	to	33	percent.	Without	the	type	of	information	that	would	be	provided	to	voters	from	this	reform,	I	strongly	believe	that	our	country’s	news	consumption	habits	will	continue	to	trend	in	a	more	partisan	manner	and	thus	our	elections	will	continue	to	produce	
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a	polarized	government	and	voters	continue	to	draw	upon	their	favorite	partisan	news	networks.		 As	is	the	case	in	most	scenarios,	individuals	who	are	misinformed	or	unprepared	often	perform	worse	than	their	counterparts	who	are	prepared.	This	is	not	to	state	that	voting	for	one	party	or	another	would	classify	someone	as	being	misinformed	or	unprepared,	but	instead	that	voters	who	are	not	receiving	quality,	in-depth	coverage	of	the	issues,	speeches,	and	policy	positions	that	matter	in	an	election	are	not	making	the	best	decision	they	are	capable	of.	To	borrow	the	definition	of	Richard	Lau	and	David	Redlawsk	(1997	586),	“a	‘correct’	vote	decision	[is]	one	that	is	the	same	as	the	choice	which	would	have	been	made	under	conditions	of	full	information.”	A	study	conducted	by	Anthony	Fowler	and	Michele	Margolis	(2013)	illustrates	this	point.	Their	study	tested	the	effects	of	additional	electoral	and	political	information	on	vote	choice,	and	they	found	that	“many	Americans	are	uninformed	about	the	positions	of	major	political	parties	on	key	issues,	and	this	lack	of	information	distorts	their	ability	to	translate	their	preferences	into	partisan	preferences	and	vote	choices,”	(Fowler	and	Margolis	2013).	Furthermore,	Fowler	and	Margolis’	study	(2013,	109)	illustrates	a	clear	connection	between	information	and	political	polarization,	as	one	of	their	major	findings	was	that	“when	the	electorate	receives	more	policy-relevant	information	it	systematically	shifts	towards	the	Democratic	Party.”	This	study	illustrates	not	only	how	political	information	can	shape	vote	choice,	but	also	demonstrates	how	this	new	information	leads	to	many	voters	to	change	their	ideological	identification.	Until	all	voters	are	capable	of	accessing	and	drawing	upon	non-partisan,	quality	
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information	in	their	candidate	evaluations,	it	is	likely	that	results	that	we	increasingly	witnessed	in	elections	will	continue:	that	America	will	continue	to	elect	ideologically	extreme	individuals	and	form	a	polarized	government.	Thus	if	implemented,	I	believe	that	this	reform	would	provide	insight	and	information	to	voters,	perhaps	altering	their	political	perspective	and	voting	habits,	something	that	would	directly	affect	the	levels	of	political	polarization	in	America.			 In	terms	of	understanding	how	creating	a	more	informed	electorate	would	address	the	issue	of	political	polarization,	it	is	clear	that	this	reform	would	aim	primarily	to	address	the	levels	of	political	polarization	and	the	issue	at	its	core	as	opposed	to	tackling	the	effects	of	political	polarization.	While	of	course,	if	successful,	this	reform	would	gradually	rid	American	government	of	the	debilitating	effects	of	political	polarization,	it	would	do	so	by	bridging	the	gap	between	voters	on	the	two	ideological	sides	of	the	divide.		As	voters	would	be	able	to	visualize	and	better	comprehend	the	various	ideological	views	of	candidates,	the	nation’s	electorate	would	undergo	a	transitional	period	between	their	partisan	voting	behavior	and	a	voting	behavior	that	would	be	shaped	by	their	new	insight.	Ideally,	as	voters	understand	the	various	ideologies	possessed	by	candidates,	they	will	factor	that	new	information	into	their	decision-making	process.	If	so,	the	hope	would	be	that	as	voters	get	a	greater	sense	of	candidates’	ideologies	they	would	favor	less	ideologically	extreme	individuals	for	office.	In	that	sense,	the	proposal	that	Bonica	(2015)	and	Prior	and	Stroud	(2015)	put	forth	is	the	one	that	in	my	estimation	is	quite	capable	of	bringing	about	substantial	change	to	political	polarization	in	America.		
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	 In	addition	to	evaluating	how	the	reform	to	create	a	more	informed	electorate	would	address	the	issue	of	political	polarization,	it,	of	course,	is	vital	to	grasp	the	political	viability	of	the	reform.	In	my	estimation,	reforms	to	provide	greater	access	to	information	would	be	met	with	resounding	support	from	politicians,	politically	involved	groups,	as	well	as	the	public.	I	believe	this	for	several	reasons,	first	of	which	is	the	fact	that	the	reform	does	not	benefit	one	political	party	over	another	and	thus	would	not	immediately	be	shot	down	by	a	sizable	portion	of	the	American	political	system.	Secondly,	the	public	perception	of	any	groups	or	individuals	opposed	to	providing	greater	resources	to	voters	would	be	quite	negative,	as	it	would	give	the	appearance	of	intentionally	trying	to	suppress	voters.		 Although	there	would	be	general	support	for	reform,	I	believe	that	there	would	be	an	intense	battle	over	the	details	of	the	proposal.	As	stated	before,	American	politics	in	presently	in	a	highly	polarized	state,	something	that	is	furthered	by	the	fact	that	many	Americans	only	consume	news	from	sources	that	match	their	ideological	viewpoints,	something	illustrated	by	the	study	cited	above	by	Gottfried,	Barthel,	and	Mitchell	(2017).	I	believe	that	the	results	of	this	study	show	that	most	Americans	would	have	a	hard	time	overcoming	their	skepticism	in	trusting	a	source	other	than	their	preferred	one,	particularly	one	that	claims	to	be	non-partisan.	In	order	to	sufficiently	win	support	for	this	new	information	guide,	it	is	important	that	both	elected	officials	from	both	parties	as	well	as	both	sides’	party	leaders	endorse	this	reform.	If	not	addressed	properly	and	sufficiently,	this	problem	could	leave	the	reform	toothless,	as	many	Americans	would	simply	fail	to	consume	the	information	being	provided	to	them.		A	second	issue	that	I	believe	would	impact	
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the	political	viability	of	this	reform	is	the	fact	that	politicians	would	nitpick	at	who	would	be	entrusted	to	provide	this	non-partisan	information,	and	of	course	once	produced	the	content	of	the	voter	guide	would	almost	certainly	be	contested.	In	my	estimation,	this	problem	would	occur	after	the	implementation	of	the	reform,	and	if	politicians	begin	to	question	the	validity	of	the	information	provided	in	the	guide	and	it	would	be	quite	easy	for	the	guide	to	be	framed	as	a	source	of	biased,	untrustworthy	news.		No	reform	is	without	its	political	obstacles,	and	so	too	is	the	case	with	this	proposal,	even	though	it	may	be	the	least	controversial	and	most	impactful	of	the	three	reforms	discussed	in	this	chapter.			 It	is	my	estimation	that	in	theory	this	reform	to	provide	quality,	in-depth	and	non-partisan	information	to	voters	in	the	form	of	a	guide	would	be	one	that	could	be	easily	implemented	as	well	as	the	one	that	is	likely	to	bring	about	a	great	deal	of	change	to	the	levels	of	political	polarization	in	America.	This	reform	goes	directly	to	what	I	believe	to	be	the	source	of	the	problem	with	the	American	public,	the	fact	that	many	voters	often	lack	adequate	knowledge	on	the	issues	and	positions	of	candidates,	and	thus	fail	to	see	the	implications	of	voting	to	office	ideologically	extreme	individuals.	Furthermore,	of	the	many	proposals	discussed,	the	challenges	on	the	path	to	implementation	are	far	fewer	and	far	less	towering	than	those	faced	by	other	reforms.	The	only	risk	that	troubles	me	is	the	fact	that	this	reform	would	require	the	buy-in	of	voters	to	actually	use	it	during	their	decision-making	process.	Further	research	could	be	conducted	to	determine	whether	or	not	these	sorts	of	guides	would	actually	be	utilized	by	voters	to	determine	whether	America’s	voters	simply	do	not	have	access	to	the	information	or	whether	they	do	not	actually	care	
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about	having	information	at	all.	In	all,	this	reform	has	the	ability	to	reshape	the	nature	of	the	American	electorate	and	thus	bring	the	needed	change	to	our	polarized	state	of	government.		
Reform:	Altering	the	Content	Covered	by	Major	News	Outlets			 The	news	sources	in	America	are	vast	in	number	as	well	as	in	viewpoints.		Dealing	with	the	medium	of	television	the	sources	range	from	the	most	local	news	stations	that	cover	the	events	in	a	certain	town	to	national	cable	networks	that	highlight	the	major	stories	in	an	entire	country	or	world.	The	process	of	reforming	a	sector	as	large	as	the	media	is	no	small	feat,	but	the	reality	is	that	the	role	of	the	media	in	politics	is	deeply	intertwined	with	the	problem	of	political	polarization.	In	understanding	why	the	television	media	has	been	targeted	specifically,	it	is	important	to	note	that	according	to	a	Pew	Research	Center	poll	from	2016,	approximately	57	percent	of	all	Americans	get	their	news	from	watching	TV	(Mitchell	et.	al	2016).	The	reform	would	push	the	major	news	outlets	to	dedicate	a	greater	portion	of	their	news	packages	to	candidate	speeches,	policy	evaluations,	and	other	substantive	election	news.	This	does	not	mean	the	coverage	has	to	be	completely	unbiased.	Cable	news	networks	like	Fox	News	and	MSNBC	would	still	be	able	to	provide	punditry	that	either	bashes	or	promotes	a	particular	issue	or	candidate,	but	they	would	still	need	to	provide	an	unbiased	explanation	of	a	candidate’s	platform	or	policies.	This	too	would	apply	to	local	news	channels,	which	also	reach	a	broad	audience,	and	again	fails	to	provide	viewers	with	substantive	coverage	of	elections.	Presently,	the	American	public	can	choose	from	a	whole	host	
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of	news	platforms,	but	the	major	news	outlets,	particularly	the	sources	that	distribute	the	news	primarily	through	the	television,	tend	to	focus	their	content	on	polling	or	personality	as	opposed	speeches	and	policy.	This	was	the	case	in	the	2016	election,	as	a	study	conducted	by	Thomas	Patterson	(2016)	details	the	breakdown	of	the	type	of	campaign	coverage	during	the	primary	contests.	Patterson	(2016)	notes	that	56	percent	of	coverage	was	dedicated	to	the	“competitive	game”	or	as	many	refer	to	it	as	the	“horse	race”	narrative,	essentially	a	discussion	of	who	was	winning	or	losing	in	a	given	contest.	Comparatively,	substantive	concerns,	such	as	policy	positions	and	background	election	issues,	only	received	11	percent	of	all	coverage.	From	Patterson’s	(2016)	work,	it	is	clear	that	the	media	coverage	was	lacking	in	its	substantive	coverage.		 Media	is	crucial	to	the	outcome	of	any	election,	and	this	is	indicated	by	the	fact	that	campaigns	at	nearly	all	levels	of	government	retain	staffers	to	deal	with	the	press	or	even	public	relations	firms.	The	media	acts	as	a	megaphone	that	if	used	correctly,	can	broadcast	a	campaign’s	messages	to	voters	frequently	and	can	shape	the	nature	of	discussion	in	an	election.	In	addition	to	the	role	that	the	media	plays	in	the	campaigns	themselves,	the	public	relies	on	media	to	learn	about	the	issues	at	hand	and	what	each	candidate	has	proposed	to	address	them.	The	fact	is	that	as	polarization	has	risen,	there	also	has	been	an	emergence	of	partisan	cable	news	networks,	which	in	turn	has	impacted	the	popularity,	and	viability	of	traditional	news	networks.	While	the	traditional	news	networks	are	still	popular,	as	the	study	conducted	by	Gottfried,	Barthel,	and	Mitchell	(2017)	shows,	more	and	more	voters	are	favoring	partisan	cable	news.	The	circumstances	create	an	electorate	that	turns	
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to	news	sources	that	are	biased	in	their	coverage,	something	that	has	been	translated	into	the	nature	of	our	government.	As	stated	before,	a	great	deal	of	Americans	get	their	news	from	within	their	political	circles,	and	as	the	study	conducted	by	Gottfried,	Barthel,	and	Mitchell	(2017)	shows,	where	people	get	their	news	is	becoming	even	more	partisan	based.	Thus	if	it	were	possible	to	inject	the	coverage	provided	partisan	news	sources	like	Fox	News	or	MSNBC	with	a	degree	of	unbiased,	factual	coverage	it	would	go	a	long	way	to	creating	a	more	informed	voting	public.			 The	present	problem	with	the	media’s	coverage	of	elections	contributes	to	the	issue	that	was	touched	upon	in	Bonica	(2015)	and	Prior	and	Stroud’s	(2015)	proposed	reform:	the	fact	that	voters	lack	access	and	exposure	to	quality,	substantive	coverage	has	contributed	to	the	levels	of	polarization	in	government.		Revisiting	the	study	conducted	by	Fowler	and	Margolis	(2014),	there	is	a	clear	effect	on	vote	choice,	particularly	the	degree	to	which	the	electorate	supports	one	party,	that	stems	from	individuals	being	provided	additional	information.	Again,	voting	for	one	party	or	another	does	not	qualify	an	individual’s	decision	as	a	poor	one,	but	instead	the	fact	that	an	individual	fails	to	receive	quality,	non-partisan	campaign	coverage	prevents	them	from	making	a	fully	informed	decision.	Without	this	type	of	coverage,	which	is	essentially	relatively	uncommon	in	the	present	day	media,	voters	are	left	to	make	their	decisions	based	on	the	partisan	cues	that	are	covered	in	the	media.			 In	order	to	solve	the	problem	of	what	information	is	received	by	voters,	many	would	say	that	the	most	efficient	way	is	to	go	directly	to	the	source	of	the	
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information	and	reform	it.	By	having	media	outlets,	particularly	the	television	mediums,	devote	a	larger	portion	of	their	coverage	to	the	substantive	material	in	campaigns,	voters	would	gain	exposure	to	the	political	reality	outside	their	bubbles.	Furthermore,	they	would	be	more	knowledgeable	about	where	candidates	stand	on	a	particular	issue.	Through	this	method,	this	reform	aims	to	address	the	issue	of	political	polarization	head	on.	Assuming	that	voters	form	the	foundations	of	their	voting	habits	through	the	information	they	receive,	by	altering	their	exposure	to	include	more	unbiased	and	substantive	policy	information,	their	habits	overall	would	likely	be	impacted.	Furthermore,	it	is	important	to	note	that	this	proposal	does	not	eliminate	partisan	news,	but	instead	increases	the	accessibility	of	more	substantive	information.	The	reason	why	the	content	of	news	coverage	is	targeted	as	opposed	to	say	eliminating	partisan	news	sources	entirely	is	that	studies	have	been	conducted	that	say	that	partisan	news	networks	do	not	directly	affect	the	levels	of	political	polarization	amongst	the	public.	Markus	Prior	(2013)	studied	this	topic	and	concluded	that	there	was	mixed	evidence	to	support	the	notion	that	partisan	news	networks	increase	the	levels	of	polarization.	What	Prior’s	study	indicates	is	that	a	great	deal	of	the	issue	stems	from	the	content	of	coverage,	which	lacks	devotion	to	substantive	issues.	Given	that	the	new	information	would	be	relatively	unbiased	and	would	provide	a	larger	foundation	of	policy	information	leads	me	to	believe	that	in	fact,	many	voters	would	come	to	a	different	conclusion	in	the	voting	booth,	as	this	new	information	would	alter	their	voter	decision-making	process	throughout	the	campaign.	The	changes	that	would	arise	as	a	result	of	the	
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implementation	of	this	reform	would	undoubtedly	impact	the	levels	of	political	polarization	in	government.				 Enacting	this	reform	would	explicitly	impact	the	First	Amendment	rights	of	the	media	outlets,	by	essentially	making	them	alter	the	way	that	they	cover	campaigns.	Thus,	I	deem	the	political	viability	of	this	reform	to	be	highly	questionable.	In	previous	generations,	such	a	move	would	be	considered	to	be	undemocratic	and	compared	to	actions	in	Soviet	Russia,	but	as	politicians,	pundits	and	the	general	public	begin	to	grasp	with	the	challenge	of	“fake	news”	and	begin	to	understand	how	the	media	influences	voter	decision-making,	there	are	many	who	could	be	persuaded	to	support	the	implementation	of	a	form	of	news	regulation.	Factoring	in	the	broad	support	that	the	First	Amendment	has	in	America,	it	seems	unlikely	to	me	that	a	proposal	that	directly	meddles	with	the	media	outlets	would	receive	support	from	politicians	or	the	public.	In	fact,	I	believe	that	many	in	America	would	perceive	the	implementation	of	this	reform	as	the	beginning	of	a	slippery	slope,	one	that	would	slowly	erode	the	freedoms	granted	by	the	First	Amendment.	Based	on	the	sentiment	presented	above,	I	deem	the	likelihood	that	this	reform	would	be	able	to	be	enacted	presently	to	be	quite	low.		 Although	the	role	that	the	media	plays	in	elections	only	continues	to	grow,	the	present	path	that	our	country	is	one	that	is	troublesome	given	the	degree	to	which	the	coverage	presented	is	biased	and	focuses	on	more	peripheral	issues	of	the	campaign	as	opposed	to	the	substantive	ones.	Additionally,	as	America	has	seemingly	entered	into	a	“post-truth”	society	where	even	the	president	attempts	to	discredit	opposing	news	sources,	it	is	not	surprising	that	scholars	have	taken	aim	at	
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the	industry.	Although	reforming	the	media	outlets	to	change	the	type	of	coverage	they	provide	to	the	public	is	an	alarming	action	to	take,	and	one	that	is	almost	certainly	unachievable	currently,	it	is	one	that	would	bring	about	a	great	deal	of	positive	change,	including	broadening	the	perspectives	of	many	Americans.	Further	research	could	be	conducted	in	order	to	determine	how	this	proposal	could	be	implemented	in	online	mediums,	as	the	role	of	online	sources	is	only	poised	to	grow	in	the	years	to	come.	Many	would	not	deem	this	reform	necessary	today,	but	in	two	or	three	years	if	the	Trump	administration	continues	to	repeat	its	actions	towards	the	press,	for	example	calling	certain	outlets	like	CNN	and	The	New	York	Times	enemies	of	the	public,	that	sentiment	may	certainly	change.			
Conclusion			 As	voters	are	the	most	important	actors	in	any	election,	it	should	be	a	cause	for	concern	when	they	are	so	clearly	being	deprived	of	the	full	picture.	The	two	reforms	discussed	above	would	each	take	aim	at	providing	more	information	to	the	electorate	in	the	hopes	of	alleviating	the	levels	of	political	polarization	in	America.	Being	that	I	believe	Bonica	(2015)	and	Prior	and	Stroud’s	(2015)	proposal	to	create	a	voter	guide	with	evaluations	of	the	candidates’	ideologies	and	their	policy	proposals	has	a	great	likelihood	of	to	impact	the	issue	of	political	polarization	and	is	also	much	more	feasible	than	the	proposal	to	force	the	media	to	alter	its	coverage	of	elections,	I	deem	that	reform	to	be	the	most	worthwhile	of	pursuing	in	the	fight	against	political	polarization	in	America	out	of	the	two	reforms	reviewed	in	this	chapter.	
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Chapter	5:	Electoral	Reforms			 A	fourth	and	final	area	that	scholars	have	targeted	for	reform	in	the	hopes	of	addressing	the	levels	of	political	polarization	in	America	is	our	nation’s	electoral	system.	The	electoral	system	encompasses	a	variety	of	different	aspects,	including	the	drawing	of	districts,	both	primary	and	general	elections,	and	voter	engagement	amongst	others,	which	combine	to	create	the	process	by	which	America	forms	its	government	at	all	levels.	As	the	electoral	system	carries	a	tremendous	weight	in	both	who	gets	elected	to	political	office	and	the	overall	political	discourse	in	this	country,	scholars	have	rightfully	targeted	this	area	as	a	means	of	solving	the	problem	of	political	polarization.			 In	this	chapter,	I	will	be	focusing	on	three	proposed	reforms	that	target	different	areas	of	America’s	electoral	system.	These	reforms	are	redistricting	reform,	voter	turnout	reform,	and	primary	election	reform.	Thomas	Mann	and	Norman	Ornstein	(2012),	as	well	as	Gary	Jacobson	(2015),	have	identified	that	the	process	by	which	our	congressional	districts	are	drawn	has	become	extremely	flawed,	and	suggest	handing	over	the	redistricting	process	to	an	independent	non-partisan	commission.	Several	scholars,	including	Mann	and	Ornstein	(2012),	Arend	Lijphart	(2015),	and	Elaine	Kamarck	(2015),	hone	in	on	the	issue	of	voter	turnout	in	elections,	suggesting	many	reforms	that	address	how	individuals	register	to	vote,	ID	laws,	and	when	Election	Day	is	held.	A	great	deal	of	reforms	have	targeted	the	primary	electoral	system	in	our	country	indirectly,	but	both	Mann	and	Ornstein	(2012)	as	well	as	Jacobson	(2015),	suggest	that	we	must	take	steps	to	reform	the	system	directly	by	implementing	alternative	primary	systems.		
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	 The	goal	for	this	chapter	is	to	evaluate	which	of	the	aforementioned	reforms	addressing	the	American	electoral	system	is	most	worthwhile	of	pursuing.	To	do	so,	the	follow	five	questions	will	be	answered	for	each	proposed	reform:	what	is	the	reform,	what	is	the	problem	that	the	reform	addresses,	how	is	that	problem	related	to	political	polarization,	how	does	the	reform	address	political	polarization,	and	what	is	the	political	viability	of	this	reform.	The	answers	to	these	questions	allows	for	a	comparison	between	each	of	the	reforms	discussed	and	provide	the	justification	for	why	one	reform	is	the	most	worthy	of	pursuing.			
Reform:	Redistricting	Reform			 One	reform	that	is	backed	by	Mann	and	Ornstein	(2012),	as	well	as	Jacobson	(2015),	is	to	shift	control	of	the	redistricting	process	to	independent	non-partisan	commissions.	Independent	non-partisan	redistricting	commissions	can	vary	in	their	size	but	are	balanced	in	the	political	leanings	of	its	members	(Loyola	Law	School	2017).	The	individuals	selected	to	serve	on	a	redistricting	commission	are	tasked	with	redrawing	a	given	state’s	various	political	districts,	in	the	case	of	this	reform	the	congressional	districts.	Furthermore,	the	factors	that	guide	the	redistricting	commissions	vary,	but	typically	are	centered	on	district	shape,	geographical	features	and	political	competitiveness	(Loyola	Law	School	2017).	This	would	be	a	dramatic	change	from	most	present	redistricting	process	whereby	each	state	is	allowed	to	determine	how	its	congressional	districts	are	drawn.	Of	the	43	states	that	have	more	than	one	congressional	district,	only	four	of	them	(California,	Arizona,	Idaho,	and	Washington)	have	redistricting	processes	that	are	not	handled	by	
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politicians	in	some	form	(Loyola	Law	School	2017).	Not	only	would	this	reform	mean	that	43	states	would	have	to	completely	overhaul	their	redistricting	process,	but	also	the	implementation	of	this	reform	would	remove	the	partisan	aspect	of	redistricting	by	dramatically	reducing	the	influence	of	politicians	in	the	process.	What	this	reform	would	not	do	is	that	it	would	not	force	states	to	alter	how	frequently	districts	would	be	redrawn.	The	reform	proposed	by	Mann	and	Ornstein	(2012)	and	Jacobson	(2015)	would	attempt	to	remove	the	partisan	influence	in	the	redistricting	process	by	giving	control	of	all	state’s	redistricting	systems	to	independent	commissions.			 The	problem	that	scholars	have	identified	is	that	the	process	by	which	America’s	congressional	districts	are	drawn	is	an	unbalanced	one	and	one	that	is	purposely	crafted	with	the	intent	of	lowering	the	degree	of	competitiveness	in	the	districts.	State	legislatures,	which	are	responsible	for	the	redistricting	process	in	37	states,	often	draw	districts	in	such	a	way	to	favor	the	party	that	is	in	the	majority	within	the	state	legislature	(Loyola	Law	School	2017).	As	districts	have	been	drawn	in	favor	of	one	political	party	or	another,	the	overall	level	of	competition	has	diminished	and	thus	the	redistricting	process	has	led	to	the	creation	of	more	ideologically	extreme	districts.	Nate	Silver	(2012)	notes	this	change	highlighting	the	fact	that	in	1992,	103	members	of	the	House	were	elected	from	swing	districts	or	districts	where	the	margin	of	victory	was	within	5	percentage	points	of	the	national	total.	Silver	notes	that	in	2012	that	number	was	down	to	35	members	of	the	House.	Thus,	the	redistricting	process	has	not	only	impacted	the	overall	level	of	political	
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competition	across	America,	it	has	also	contributed	to	who	can	get	elected	to	Congress.			 The	proposal	to	give	redistricting	power	in	all	states	to	an	independent	commission	clearly	addresses	an	issue	that	is	tied	directly	to	the	problem	of	political	polarization	in	America.	The	lack	of	competition	within	congressional	districts,	as	many	districts	are	drawn	to	favor	one	party,	has	enabled	those	on	far	right	and	far	left	to	push	into	government	many	of	their	ideological	peers.	I	have	noted	repeatedly	that	the	ideological	overlap	amongst	members	of	Congress	has	disappeared	entirely	in	the	last	40	years,	something	that	in	part	has	become	a	reality	due	to	the	more	frequent	election	of	ideologically	extreme	candidates	(DeSilver	2014).	Those	candidates	are	able	to	flourish	within	politically	uncompetitive	and	unbalanced	districts	as	those	who	consistently	turn	out	to	vote	are	more	likely	to	be	ideologically	far	left	or	far	right	(Dimock	et	al.	2014).	Furthermore,	as	districts	have	continuously	been	drawn	in	such	a	way	that	prevents	a	competitive	election	between	both	parties,	the	ideologically	extreme	elected	officials	sent	to	Congress	from	these	districts	have	contributed	to	the	overall	levels	of	gridlock	and	dysfunction	of	the	federal	government.	The	problem	of	a	broken	redistricting	process,	a	problem	that	Mann	and	Ornstein	(2012)	and	Jacobson’s	(2015)	proposal	aims	to	fix,	is	one	that	has	clearly	contributed	to	the	overall	levels	of	political	polarization	in	America,	particularly	in	Congress	as	the	flaws	in	the	system	make	it	easier	for	more	ideologically	extreme	individuals	to	be	elected.			 Looking	at	how	redistricting	reform	will	address	the	issue	of	political	polarization,	I	first	will	look	at	the	methods	by	which	the	reform	aims	to	address	the	
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issue	and	then	examine	scholarly	analysis	that	looks	at	whether	or	not	the	reform,	where	it	has	been	implemented,	has	been	successful	in	achieving	its	aim.	Redistricting	reform	is	clear	in	its	intentions,	as	it	aims	to	lower	the	levels	of	political	polarization	by	redrawing	districts	in	such	a	way	as	to	create	more	politically	heterogeneous	districts	that	are	more	competitive.	In	theory,	this	would	be	a	fantastic	way	to	significantly	lower	the	number	of	ideologically	extreme	members	of	Congress,	but	several	studies	conducted	by	scholars	show	that	in	many	cases	of	redistricting	reform,	the	redrawn	districts	tend	to	have	more	ideologically	extreme	representatives.	The	research,	which	was	conducted	by	Nolan	McCarty	and	Boris	Shor	(2015,	30),	says	that	many	redistricting	reform	efforts	fail,	“given	the	strong	residential	clustering	of	citizens	with	similar	social,	economic,	and	political	views.”	Thus,	McCarty	and	Shor	(2015,	30)	state	that	many	redistricting	reforms	aim	to	create	spatially	diverse	districts,	which	“refer	to	the	variation	of	individual	attributes	(e.g.	income,	race,	education)	across	geographic	space.”	McCarty	and	Shor	(2015)	point	to	the	work	of	Nicholas	Stephanopoulos	(2011),	who	analyzed	spatial	diversity	in	congressional	districts	and	came	to	the	conclusion	that	districts	that	were	more	spatially	diverse	elected	to	the	House	of	Representatives	more	ideologically	polarized	individuals	than	less	spatially	diverse	districts.	McCarty	and	Shor	(2015)	concur	with	Stephanopoulos’	(2011)	conclusion,	and	essentially	argue	that	to	fix	the	issue	of	political	polarization	by	focusing	on	redistricting	reform	would	be	a	fruitless	endeavor.	That	being	said,	there	are	also	studies	that	implication	that	redistricting	can	have	an	effect	on	the	levels	of	polarization	in	government.	Research	conducted	by	David	Oedel,	Allen	Lynch,	Sean	Mulhohand	and	
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Neil	Edwards	(2009)	finds	that	members	of	the	House	of	Representatives	elected	from	states	with	independent	redistricting	commissions	have	less	partisan	voting	records	than	their	peers	from	states	without	independent	commissions.		Based	on	the	work	of	scholars	like	McCarty	and	Shor	(2015),	Stephanopoulos	(2011)	and	Oedel	et	al.	(2009),	it	is	clear	that	scholars	are	mixed	in	their	evaluations	of	the	effects	of	reforming	the	redistricting	process	on	political	polarization.	Thusly,	although	I	accept	the	validity	of	the	theory	behind	the	reform,	but	based	on	the	empirical	evidence	undertaken	by	others,	I	cannot	definitively	say	that	the	implementation	of	this	reform	would	address	the	issue	of	political	polarization.		 In	examining	the	political	viability	of	this	proposal,	we	must	first	acknowledge	the	fact	that	in	four	states	independent	commissions	already	control	the	redistricting	process.	What	makes	this	fact	more	intriguing	is	the	fact	two	of	the	states,	California	and	Washington,	tend	to	be	strong	blue	states,	while	the	other	two,	Arizona	and	Idaho,	tend	to	be	strong	red	states.	What	is	indicative	of	this	is	that	past	proposals	to	shift	control	of	the	redistricting	process	to	independent	commissions	has	found	support	from	both	the	left	and	the	right.	All	four	of	the	states	mentioned	above	switched	to	an	independent	redistricting	commission	after	ballot	measures	that	were	supported	by	a	majority	of	residents	in	those	states	(Loyola	Law	School	2017).	Although	this	may	be	true,	as	the	previous	implementations	of	independent	redistricting	commissions	have	all	come	on	a	state-by-state	basis,	it	is	quite	likely	that	many	states	that	are	either	deeply	liberal	or	deeply	conservative	will	forgo	the	implementation	of	this	reform	in	favor	of	keeping	their	current	system	until	they	determine	that	an	independent	redistricting	commission	would	pose	no	threat	to	
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their	grip	on	political	power.	This	conclusion	stems	from	the	fact	that	many	politicians	might	be	threatened	by	the	implications	of	creating	an	independent	redistricting	commission.	It	is	my	estimation	that	if	this	reform	were	to	force	all	37	states	to	adopt	it,	the	political	viability	would	be	significantly	reduced	as	opposed	to	if	it	were	to	be	implemented	on	a	state-by-state	basis.	An	additional	benefit	of	implementing	an	independent	redistricting	commission	is	that	the	state’s	control	the	redistricting	process,	which	means	the	reform	could	be	implemented	without	needing	the	action	of	Congress.	As	each	state	varies	in	its	political	makeup	and	overall	level	of	political	competitiveness,	there	certainly	would	be	pushback	from	elected	officials	in	states	who	worry	about	what	stimulating	more	competition	through	the	redrawing	of	districts	would	do	their	electoral	chances.	In	all,	I	believe	that	if	carried	out	by	individual	states,	this	reform	would	have	a	very	strong	chance	of	being	implemented,	and	eventually	might	even	reach	all	43	applicable	states,	particularly	as	voters	in	states	begin	to	feel	the	effects	of	switching	to	independent	redistricting	commissions	on	their	elections.			
Reform:	Remove	Obstacles	to	Increase	Voter	Turnout			 Many	Americans	would	consider	the	process	of	registering	to	vote	and	voting	itself	to	be,	although	somewhat	time-consuming,	relatively	painless.	Beneath	that	surface	sentiment,	however,	there	are	hundreds	of	thousands	of	individuals	who	cannot	vote	or	are	prevented	from	voting	due	to	several	obstacles	that	make	voting	entirely	too	difficult	for	them.	These	obstacles	include	ID	laws,	the	allowable	methods	of	voting,	and	when	Election	Day	is	held.	Reforms	to	increase	voter	
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turnout,	which	are	backed	by	many	scholars,	including	Mann	and	Ornstein	(2012),	Lijphart	(2015),	and	Kamarck	(2015)	amongst	others,	focus	on	removing	these	obstacles	in	order	to	stimulate	high	voter	turnout	amongst	the	electorate.	These	reforms	would	fundamentally	affect	how	American	elections	are	held	and	how	voters	participate	in	them,	with	the	hope	that	if	barriers	are	removed	to	voting,	more	people	would	participate	in	the	process.			 The	problem	that	this	reform	aims	to	address	is	the	relatively	low	and	inconsistent	levels	of	turnout	amongst	American	voters.	According	to	statistics	gathered	by	the	Pew	Research	Center	(DeSilver	2016),	only	53.6	percent	of	the	American	public	of	voting	age	voted	in	the	2012	presidential	election,	a	figure	that	puts	the	U.S.	below	countries	like	Norway,	Czech	Republic,	and	Turkey.	The	fact	that	nearly	half	the	individuals	who	are	eligible	to	vote	don’t	is	a	problem	in	itself.	As	is	clear	from	the	facts	presented	by	DeSilver	(2016),	present	American	elections	are	likely	creating	results	that	misrepresent	the	true	sentiment	of	Americans.	Of	course,	many	Americans	are	not	politically	engaged,	as	you	recall	I	discussed	a	series	of	reforms	targeting	the	American	electorate	in	a	previous	chapter,	but	the	voting	obstacles	that	exist	also	contribute	to	the	dismal	turnout	figures.	Of	course,	as	we	begin	to	consider	how	this	problem	is	related	to	the	issue	of	political	polarization	it	is	important	to	consider	the	fact	that	who	votes	in	elections	has	an	impact	on	who	gets	elected.		 The	issue	of	poor	voter	turnout	not	only	affects	both	political	parties,	but	it	also	affects	the	political	middle	of	the	country.	What	we	have	seen	is	that	this	level	of	reduced	participation,	partly	as	a	result	of	voter	ID	laws,	has	increasingly	
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produced	a	polarized	government,	as	DeSilver	(2014)	shows	that	the	ideological	overlap	in	both	the	House	and	Senate	has	significantly	dropped	off	over	the	years.	If	obstacles	to	voting	were	removed	that	would	increase	voter	turnout	across	the	country	it	is	likely	that	many	future	elections	would	be	more	competitive	than	they	are	now.	Take	for	example	the	analysis	done	by	Nate	Silver	(2012),	from	FiveThirtyEight,	who	estimates	that	ID	laws	could	decrease	voter	turnout	anywhere	between	.8	percent	and	2.4	percent,	which	may	not	seem	like	a	great	deal	of	votes,	but	when	looking	at	a	presidential	election	that	percentage	can	amount	to	tens	or	even	hundreds	of	thousands	of	votes.	Each	vote	lost	to	ID	laws,	or	from	the	fact	that	voting	can	be	inconvenient	for	individuals	who	have	multiple	responsibilities	to	balance,	can	accumulate,	and	before	we	realize	it	can	swing	the	outcome	of	an	election	in	favor	of	one	side	or	another.	Furthermore,	as	many	studies	including	the	one	done	by	Pew	Research	Center	(Dimock	et	al.	2014),	individuals	who	strongly	identify	with	one	party	or	another	are	far	more	likely	to	turnout	to	vote.	According	to	Dimock’s	study,	78	of	“consistently	conservative”	individuals	always	vote	and	58	percent	of	“consistently	liberal”	individuals	always	vote.	Compare	that	to	only	39	percent	of	“mixed	ideology”	individuals	who	say	the	same,	and	what	becomes	clear	is	that	regardless	of	the	obstacles	to	voting	those	on	the	far	left	and	far	right	are	always	going	to	make	it	to	the	polls,	while	those	in	the	middle	are	more	likely	to	stay	home.	Thus,	removing	many	of	the	obstacles	to	voting,	as	Lijphart	(2015),	Kamarck	(2015)	and	Mann	and	Ornstein	(2012)	suggest	we	do,	would	directly	impact	the	levels	of	political	polarization,	particularly	in	government	as	it	would	significantly	impact	the	ideological	makeup	of	those	who	vote	in	any	given	election.	
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	 Each	of	the	three	reforms	discussed	in	this	section	all	aim	to	increase	voter	turnout	as	a	means	of	addressing	political	polarization,	but	each	of	the	three	reforms	are	distinct	in	the	means	by	which	they	aim	to	do	so,	and	also	vary	in	the	degree	to	which	they	are	likely	to	be	successful.			 First	I	will	discuss	the	proposal	to	expand	access	to	mail-in	ballots.	The	thought	behind	this	reform	is	that	by	making	voting	more	convenient	through	allowing	individuals	to	vote	without	having	to	leave	their	home,	more	people	will	participate	in	elections.	In	fact,	several	states	have	implemented	voting	by	mail	in	their	elections,	and	thus	I	looked	at	the	trends	in	voter	participation	in	presidential	elections	for	the	state	of	Oregon,	which	implemented	a	vote-by-mail	(VBM)	system	in	the	late	1990s.	In	2000,	Oregon	held	their	first	presidential	general	election	in	a	VBM	system,	and	79.8	percent	of	registered	voters	participated,	up	8	percentage	points	from	the	1996	election.	The	upward	trend	continues	in	2004,	as	86.5	percent	voted	in	that	VBM	election,	and	then	essentially	plateaus	in	following	elections,	as	2008	saw	85.7	percent	participation,	and	2012	saw	82.8	percent	participation	(Oregon	Secretary	of	State	2016).	The	2016	election	saw	a	slight	drop	in	turnout	percentage,	dropping	down	to	80.3	percent,	which	was	still	9	percentage	points	higher	than	turnout	in	1996	(Oregon	Secretary	of	State	2016).	Scholars	Elizabeth	Bergman	and	Phillip	Yates	(2011)	studied	the	effects	of	switching	over	to	a	vote-by-mail	electoral	system	and	arrived	at	two	very	interesting	conclusions.	Bergman	and	Yates	(2011)	determined	that	switching	to	a	VMB	system,	the	likelihood	that	an	individual	would	vote	decreased	by	a	little	more	than	13	percent.	They	attributed	this	fact	to	the	poor	implementation	of	the	new	voting	system	by	the	County	Board	
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of	Elections.	What	the	scholars	also	discovered	is	that	if	voters	were	contacted	four	or	more	times	by	their	county	board	of	elections,	the	likelihood	that	they	would	vote	actually	increased	by	four	percent.	Therefore,	switching	to	a	vote-by-mail	system	actually	increases	turnout	significantly	if	accompanied	by	semi-frequent	reminders.	Based	on	this	information,	I	deem	the	proposal	to	implement	a	vote-by-mail	system	to	be	successful	in	its	attempts	to	boost	voter	turnout,	thus	affecting	the	ideological	makeup	of	those	voting	which	has	a	direct	effect	on	the	levels	of	political	polarization	in	government.			 Moving	on	to	an	analysis	of	how	moving	Election	Day	to	the	weekend	would	address	the	issue	of	political	polarization	by	boosting	voter	turnout,	a	few	studies	have	been	conducted	that	conclude	that	the	proposal	would	actually	do	very	little	to	change	voter	turnout.	The	U.S.	Government	Accountability	Office	(2012),	also	known	as	the	GAO,	studied	the	idea	of	moving	Election	Day	to	the	weekend	and	found	that	there	are	a	whole	host	of	obstacles	that	would	arise	that	would	make	voting	on	the	weekend	difficult.	The	same	GAO	(2012)	report	concluded	that	there	would	be	little	change	in	voter	turnout	if	elections	were	moved	to	the	weekend,	pointing	to	the	fact	that	when	it	was	offered	to	Maryland	voters	in	2010,	only	1.5	percent	took	advantage	of	the	weekend	voting	option.	The	impact	of	weekend	voting	is	particularly	hard	to	judge	as	it	is	has	been	implemented	in	such	few	elections,	so	a	great	deal	of	weight	should	be	placed	on	the	theory	behind	the	proposal.	As	stated	earlier,	moving	Election	Day	is	aimed	at	making	voting	more	convenient	for	everyone	and	thus	more	people	would	turn	out	to	vote.	Based	on	data	collected	by	the	Pew	Research	Center	(2014)	after	the	2014-midterm	elections,	that	sentiment	
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appears	to	be	true	as	35	percent	of	respondents	said	they	did	not	vote	because	of	conflicts	with	work	or	school.	The	question	then	becomes	whether	or	not	if	moved	people	would	actually	take	advantage	of	the	new	changes.	What	I	believe	is	that	the	proposal	to	move	Election	Day	to	the	weekend	possesses	limited	potential	to	raise	voter	turnout	and	thus	affect	political	polarization.		 Finally,	looking	at	the	ability	of	removing	voter	ID	laws	to	affect	the	levels	of	political	polarization,	it	is	clear	that	the	reform	would	almost	certainly	be	successful	in	its	goal	of	boosting	voter	turnout.	As	mentioned	earlier,	the	exact	figures	as	to	how	many	Americans	are	prevented	from	voting	due	to	ID	laws	is	unknown,	but	regardless	of	the	estimate	what	is	clear	is	that	there	are	many	Americans	who	cannot	vote	due	to	a	lack	of	adequate	identification.	Individuals	who	suffer	from	voter	ID	laws,	particularly	those	who	were	turned	away	at	the	polls,	are	particularly	likely	to	turn	out	to	vote	as	they	were	attempting	to	do	so	in	this	first	place,	there	is	no	doubt	in	my	mind	that	repealing	all	voter	ID	laws	would	lead	to	an	increase	in	voter	turnout.	Revisiting	the	figures	presented	by	Silver	on	how	voter	ID	laws	suppress	turnout,	he	gives	a	range	of	.8	percent	to	2.4	percent,	which	would	in	the	2016	election	would	have	translated	into	between	just	over	1	million	votes	and	2.5	million	votes,	which	depending	on	the	location	would	have	the	ability	to	change	the	outcome	of	the	contest.	Of	course,	that	boost	in	voter	turnout	may	be	temporary	as	once	voters	have	the	ability	to	vote	they	may	choose	not	to	exercise	that	right	as	there	is	no	evidence	to	support	the	notion	that	voters	that	are	affected	by	ID	laws	consistently	turnout.	Therefore	out	of	the	three	reforms	discussed	in	this	section,	it	
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is	my	estimation	that	this	reform	would	do	the	very	little	to	affect	political	polarization.			 In	discussing	the	political	viability	of	reforms	to	increase	voter	turnout	it	is	important	to	establish	that	each	of	these	sub-reforms	that	fall	under	the	larger	umbrella	of	increasing	voter	turnout	have	varying	degrees	of	opposition.	For	example,	Republicans	in	government	have	fought	vehemently	to	keep	in	place	and	expand	voter	ID	laws	across	the	country,	and	thus	the	proposal	to	eliminate	all	voter	ID	laws	would	surely	be	opposed	by	the	party	as	a	whole.	In	that	sense,	the	reform	that	targets	voter	ID	laws,	as	a	means	of	increasing	voter	turnout	is	by	far	the	most	partisan	in	its	nature,	as	it	would	pit	the	Democrats	directly	against	the	Republicans.	Given	the	slim	likelihood	that	there	would	be	bipartisan	support	for	removing	ID	laws,	I	deem	the	political	viability	of	that	reform	to	be	the	lowest	of	the	three	reforms	that	aim	to	increase	voter	turnout.			 Looking	at	the	proposal	to	change	the	day	of	the	week	when	elections	are	held,	the	prospects	are	significantly	better.	Both	parties’	voters	are	negatively	affected	by	the	fact	that	Election	Day	is	held	during	the	workweek,	as	many	employers	do	not	permit	their	employees	to	take	time	off	to	vote.	Shifting	Election	Day	to	Saturday	would	make	voting	a	whole	lot	easier	for	many	Americans,	and	would	boost	turnout	in	a	non-partisan	way.	Both	parties	have	held	primary	elections	on	Saturdays,	so	there	is	enough	precedent	to	indicate	that	this	reform	would	not	face	immediate	opposition	from	one	party.	It	should	be	noted,	though,	that	Republicans	tend	to	oppose	efforts	to	expand	voting,	as	they	believe	that	effects	help	Democrats	win	elections.	Furthermore,	as	there	are	some	religious	conflicts	
		 90	
with	moving	Election	Day	to	the	weekend,	namely	the	Sabbath	for	Judaism	and	Christianity,	which	occurs	on	Saturday	and	Sunday,	respectively.	Taking	that	into	account,	the	proposal	could	be	altered	to	expand	Election	Day	to	the	entire	weekend	to	accommodate	various	religious	beliefs.	Aside	from	the	potential	religious	objections,	I	deem	the	political	viability	of	shifting	Election	Day	to	the	weekend	to	be	quite	high,	although	not	the	highest	of	all	three	reforms	discussed	that	aim	to	increase	voter	turnout.			 I	believe	that	the	reform	to	provide	greater	access	to	mail-in	voting	is	the	reform,	out	of	the	three,	that	is	most	likely	to	implemented.	Several	reasons	have	led	me	to	this	conclusion,	the	first	of	which	is	the	fact	that	it	is	relatively	non-partisan.	It	is	my	estimation	that	neither	party	would	either	benefit	or	be	harmed	by	the	implementation	of	this	reform.	Secondly,	the	expansion	of	voting	by	mail	makes	voting	much	more	convenient,	as	voters	have	the	ballot	delivered	to	them,	fill	it	out,	and	send	it	back	without	ever	having	to	miss	work	or	wait	in	line.	Finally,	the	fact	that	mail-in	ballots	have	already	been	implemented	in	several	states,	and	is	being	targeted	for	expansion	by	other	towns	and	states	is	indicative	of	the	fact	that	people	already	support	this	proposal.	That	being	said,	the	sentiment	that	Republicans	oppose	all	proposals	to	expand	voting	still	would	likely	be	true	in	this	case.	The	three	factors	lead	me	to	believe	that	if	pursued,	the	reform	to	expand	mail-in	voting	would	have	the	highest	chance	of	implementation	of	the	three	reforms	discussed	that	aim	to	increase	voter	turnout.		
Reform:	Overhauling	Primary	Elections		
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	 America’s	primary	election	system	has	become	one	of	the	main	antagonists	in	the	struggle	to	address	the	issue	of	political	polarization	in	our	country,	which	is	why	scholars	have	put	forth	a	variety	of	proposals,	many	of	which	target	different	aspects	of	primary	elections,	that	would	reform	the	system.	The	reforms	that	I	will	be	discussing	in	this	section	are	put	forth	by	scholars	like	Mann	and	Ornstein	(2012)	and	Jacobson	(2015),	and	attempt	to	overhaul	the	entire	primary	election	process	by	replacing	the	current	system	with	a	variety	of	open	primary	systems,	similar	to	the	ones	held	by	states	across	the	country.	This	reform	would	eliminate	the	current	system	by	which	both	parties	hold	a	primary	election,	and	replace	it	with	either	a	semi-closed,	semi-open,	open,	or	non-partisan	election	system.	McGhee	et.	al.	(2013,	341)	created	a	brilliant	table,	that	I	have	included	below,	that	illustrates	the	differences	between	the	various	primary	systems.	The	major	differences	between	the	various	primary	systems	focus	on	two	factors:	who	can	vote	in	the	primary	and	how	one	registers	to	vote.	For	example,	pure	closed	primary	systems,	which	are	used	by	most	states,	only	allow	individuals	who	are	registered	members	of	a	party	to	vote	in	that	party’s	primary	election,	while	a	pure	open	system	allows	members	of	both	parties	to	vote	in	the	primary	election	granted	that	they	change	their	party	affiliation	prior	to	Election	Day.	These	alternative	primary	systems	alter	participation	in	primary	elections	by	opening	them	up	to	more	voters,	which	then	can	lead	to	alternative	primary	election	results.	The	aim	of	this	reform	is	to	alter	the	way	by	which	primary	elections	are	run,	by	changing	how	they	are	structured	and	who	can	participate	in	them.		
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		 Before	moving	on	to	answer	the	remainder	of	questions	that	are	posed	to	each	reform,	it	is	important	that	the	difference	between	the	reform	that	will	be	discussed	in	this	section	and	the	ones	that	were	discussed	in	chapter	three	are	abundantly	clear.	In	chapter	three	the	reforms	that	were	discussed	altered	primary	elections	in	such	a	way	as	to	shift	more	of	the	power	and	control	over	them	to	the	political	parties.	Those	reforms	gave	control	of	certain	aspects	of	the	election	to	the	parties,	which	of	course	affect	the	entire	primary	election	system	as	a	whole.	In	this	chapter,	the	reforms	that	will	be	discussed	aim	to	entirely	revamp	the	system,	and	do	not	aim	to	shift	control	to	the	political	parties	or	any	singular	political	actor.	While	both	sets	of	reforms	may	lead	to	similar	outcomes,	the	methods	by	which	they	achieve	those	outcomes	are	entirely	different.		 The	problem	that	this	reform	aims	to	address	is	that	America’s	current	primary	system	produces	too	many	ideologically	extreme	candidates,	which	thus	leads	to	more	ideologically	extreme	elected	officials.	This	is	partially	due	to	the	way	that	primary	elections	are	set	up,	with	candidates	from	the	same	party	competing	for	votes	from	individuals	who,	for	the	most	part,	are	also	ideologically	aligned	with	that	party.	Additionally,	the	fact	that	the	majority	of	primary	voters	are	more	
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ideologically	extreme	than	voters	in	general	elections,	which	factors	into	why	more	ideologically	candidates	emerge	from	primary	elections.	By	overhauling	the	system	entirely,	this	reform	aims	to	rid	these	two	realities	from	elections.			 The	problem	of	an	abundance	of	ideologically	extreme	candidates	and	elected	officials	is	directly	related	to	the	issue	of	political	polarization.	These	candidates	emerge	from	the	flawed	structure	of	primary	election	systems,	which	enable	the	ideologically	extreme	voters	to	play	an	outsized	role	in	who	wins.	As	was	stated	earlier,	Dimock’s	(2014)	study	shows	that	the	far	left	and	far	right	are	more	likely	to	vote,	particularly	in	primary	elections,	thus	the	closed	primary	system,	which	prevents	independents	from	participating,	enables	far	left	and	far	right	candidates	to	emerge	victoriously.	There	are	several	ways,	in	which	this	problem	is	related	to	political	polarization	the	first,	and	foremost	is	the	more	extreme	our	elected	officials	are,	the	more	likely	they	are	to	act	in	a	partisan	manner.	This	contributes	to	the	levels	of	political	polarization	seen	in	American	government,	as	well	as	to	the	degree	to	which	the	government	works	in	a	functional	manner.	Furthermore,	as	many	Americans	take	their	political	cues	and	views	from	elected	officials,	the	more	ideologically	far-out	individuals	elected,	the	greater	the	likelihood	that	individuals	will	draw	upon	those	politicians	for	their	own	views.	Thus,	the	impact	of	primary	elections	producing	partisan	candidates	reaches	beyond	the	halls	of	local,	state	or	federal	government	and	can	influence	the	political	views	and	mindsets	of	Americans	across	the	country.			 In	looking	at	how	proposed	reforms	to	alter	the	primary	electoral	system	affect	the	levels	of	political	polarization	it	is	important	to	distinguish	between	the	
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theory	behind	the	proposal	and	the	actual	results	that	have	occurred	from	its	implementation	throughout	America.	As	explained	earlier,	the	thought	behind	changing	the	means	by	which	primary	elections	are	structured,	there	would	be	an	increase	in	moderate	candidates	elected	to	office,	and	thus	the	overall	levels	of	political	polarization	in	government	would	decrease.	But	over	time	scholars	have	identified	various	conclusions	on	the	effects	of	different	primary	systems,	noting	that	only	some	types	of	alternative	primary	systems,	semi-closed	and	non-partisan,	are	moderating	in	the	effects.	For	example,	a	study	conducted	by	Elisabeth	Gerber	and	Rebecca	Morton	(1998)	finds	that	U.S.	representatives	from	states	that	hold	closed	primaries	take	policy	positions	that	are	the	furthest	from	their	district’s	median	voter’s	position.	Additionally,	Gerber	and	Morton	(1998)	find	that	U.S.	representatives	elected	from	states	that	utilize	a	semi-closed	primary	system	actually	stake	out	policy	positions	that	are	the	most	moderate.	Another	study	conducted	in	2013	by	Eric	McGhee,	Seth	Masket,	Boris	Shor,	Steven	Rogers,	and	Nolan	McCarty	(2013,	337),	finds	that	“the	openness	of	a	primary	election	has	little,	if	any,	effect	on	the	extremism	of	the	politician	it	produces.”	Interestingly	enough,	although	the	scholars	fail	to	see	a	strong	connection	between	the	various	primary	systems	and	the	level	of	extremism	of	politicians	elected,	they	do	acknowledge	that	California’s	blanket	primary	system	has,	in	fact,	achieved	bringing	about	more	moderate	politicians	(McGhee	et	al	2013).	Granted	that	as	many	primary	systems	have	come	under	changes	recently,	it	is	understandable	that	scholars	have	not	reached	a	strong	consensus	on	the	effects	of	the	reforms.	That	being	the	case,	the	lack	of	consensus	concerns	me,	for	it	would	be	disastrous	to	invest	in	overhauling	
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primary	election	systems	across	the	country	only	to	discover	that	they	truly	have	no	effect	on	the	level	of	extremism	held	by	the	politicians	elected.	Conversely,	compared	to	the	other	reforms	discussed	in	this	chapter,	almost	all	of	which	scholars	have	determined	have	no	effect	on	the	levels	of	political	polarization,	the	fact	that	some	of	the	effects	of	overhauling	primary	elections	are	unknown	is	also	a	positive	when	compared	to	its	peers	in	this	chapter.	Given	that	some	have	identified	benefits	of	implementing	alternative	forms	of	primary	systems,	and	thus	this	reform	cannot	entirely	be	classified	as	ineffective,	it	is	my	estimation	that	reforming	primary	election	systems	can	still	address	the	issue	of	political	polarization.		 As	has	been	the	case	with	several	of	the	reforms	discussed	in	this	section,	one	must	acknowledge	the	fact	that	some	of	these	reforms	have	been	implemented	already	in	states	throughout	the	country.	I	believe	that	this	reform	would	have	a	strong	chance	of	being	implemented	if	rolled	out	on	a	state-by-state	basis	to	begin.	Thus	far	California,	Louisiana,	Washington	and	Nebraska	all	utilize	some	form	of	a	blanket	primary	system	in	their	elections,	again	indicating	that	both	the	political	left	and	right	have	found	merits	in	alternative	forms	of	a	primary	election.	Louisiana,	Washington,	and	Nebraska	all	implemented	their	alternative	primary	systems	through	their	state	legislatures,	while	California’s	system	came	into	existence	via	a	ballot	measure	(National	Conference	of	State	Legislatures	2016).	An	additional	factor	that	leads	me	to	believe	that	this	proposal	would	have	a	strong	chance	of	being	enacted	is	the	fact	that	states	control	their	own	electoral	processes,	which	means	that	they	do	not	have	to	go	through	the	federal	government	to	get	approval.	The	benefit	of	this	is	that	this	reform	would	likely	not	be	impeded	by	the	partisan	
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state	of	Congress.	Of	course	in	many	states,	there	would	be	opposition	from	the	political	party	that	stands	to	lose	the	most	from	the	implementation	of	this	reform,	but	the	roadblocks	are	less	severe	than	the	ones	faced	by	legislation	at	the	federal	level.	In	all,	I	estimate	the	political	viability	of	this	reform	to	be	quite	high	due	to	its	present	level	of	support	and	the	fact	that	it	faces	fewer	obstacles	on	the	path	to	implementation.			
Conclusion			 All	three	proposals	that	aim	to	reform	America’s	electoral	system	in	the	hopes	of	addressing	the	levels	of	political	polarization	all	have	their	merits	and	faults.	Out	of	the	three,	I	believe	that	the	push	to	increase	voter	turnout,	more	specifically	the	proposal	to	switch	to	a	vote-by-mail	system,	is	the	most	worthwhile	of	pursuit.	The	reform,	which	aims	to	make	voting	easier	for	all	Americans,	and	thus	pushes	for	increased	levels	of	voter	turnout,	in	my	opinion,	has	the	ability	to	address	the	issue	of	political	polarization	and	also	is	quite	politically	viable.	Two	other	reasons	have	led	to	me	to	such	a	conclusion.	Firstly,	switching	to	a	vote-by-mail	system	has	been	proven	by	scholars	to	significantly	increase	levels	of	voter	turnout	if	implemented	properly.	The	increase	in	voter	turnout	alters	the	ideological	makeup	of	those	who	vote,	by	diluting	the	ideological	extreme	individuals	who	consistently	turnout	to	vote	with	more	moderate	voters.	By	switching	to	this	new	system	of	voting,	the	percentage	of	individuals	who	vote	in	elections	would	surely	increase,	as	was	the	case	in	Oregon,	which	saw	a	tremendous	increase	in	voter	turnout.	Additionally,	the	proposal	to	overhaul	the	method	by	which	Americans	vote	
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does	not	face	the	likely	strong	opposition	that	many	other	reforms	discussed	in	this	chapter	face,	as	it	does	not	favor	either	political	party.	That	being	said,	my	support	does	not	extend	to	the	rest	of	the	reforms	that	aim	to	boost	voter	turnout,	as	scholars	have	yet	to	determine	if	moving	Election	Day	would	boost	turnout	and	voter	ID	laws	are	an	extremely	partisan	issue,	and	their	repeal	would	certainly	face	opposition	from	Republicans.	Of	the	several	reforms	that	were	discussed	in	this	chapter,	I	believe	that	the	reform	that	pushes	to	switch	to	a	vote-by-mail	system	is	most	worthwhile	of	pursuing,	as	it	is	quite	politically	viable	and	would	bring	about	changes	that	would	affect	the	levels	of	political	polarization	in	the	country.		 	
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Chapter	6:	Conclusion			 The	level	of	political	polarization	remains	one	of	the	most	troubling	issues	that	faces	our	country	but	also	is	an	area	of	study	that	is	constantly	analyzed	for	potential	solutions.	The	effects	of	political	polarization	are	far	reaching,	affecting	everything	from	the	functionality	of	government	to	everyday	political	conversations	between	regular	people.	As	we	have	seen	in	recent	years,	the	general	political	discourse	in	America	has	taken	a	turn	for	the	worse,	with	both	sides	becoming	increasingly	hostile	towards	one	another.	This	is	especially	true	in	the	halls	of	Congress	as	bipartisanship	has	almost	entirely	become	extinct,	and	members	of	Congress	on	both	sides	of	the	aisle	engage	in	partisan	warfare	and	legislative	obstruction.		 As	the	preceding	four	chapters	illustrate,	there	are	numerous	ways	that	scholars	have	proposed	to	deal	with	the	issue	of	political	polarization.	The	overarching	areas	targeted	for	reform	that	I	highlighted	include,	reforming	governmental	procedures,	reforming	the	political	parties,	reforming	the	American	electorate,	and	finally	reforming	the	electoral	system	in	America.	The	reforms	that	were	discussed	in	each	of	these	sections	differ	in	their	goals,	as	some	aim	to	simply	mitigate	the	effects	of	political	polarization,	while	others	aim	to	tackle	the	levels	of	political	polarization	directly.			 Before	revealing	which	of	the	reforms	I	discussed	is	most	worthwhile	of	pursuit,	it	is	important	that	I	first	explain	why	the	other	reforms	that	were	discussed	in	this	work	were	not	as	good.	The	failings	of	the	other	reforms	discussed	typically	fall	into	three	distinct	characterizations,	which	are	that	either	they	were	too	
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politically	controversial,	or	they	did	not	do	enough	to	address	political	polarization,	or	that	they	were	too	damaging	to	the	foundations	of	American	democracy.		 Dealing	first	with	the	reforms	that	are	unlikely	to	affect	political	polarization,	my	research	found	several	reforms	that	fell	into	this	category.	First	and	foremost,	the	reforms	that	targeted	governmental	rules	and	procedures	aim	to	simply	mitigate	the	effects	of	political	polarization	as	opposed	to	solving	the	problem	itself.	As	a	result,	this	area	of	reform	is	highly	unlikely	to	lead	to	any	significant	impact	on	the	levels	of	political	polarization.	Similarly,	the	reforms	that	aimed	to	strengthen	political	parties	were	also	deemed	extremely	weak	in	their	ability	to	affect	political	polarization	in	America.	Additionally,	the	proposed	reform	to	move	Election	Day	to	the	weekend	was	deemed	by	scholars	to	be	entirely	ineffective	in	terms	of	addressing	political	polarization.	Finally,	the	proposal	to	overhaul	the	primary	election	system	was	also	deemed	ineffective	in	creating	more	moderate	elected	officials,	and	thus	ineffective	in	regards	to	political	polarization.	Based	on	the	research	that	indicates	these	reforms	would	be	unable	to	affect	the	issue	of	political	polarization,	they	were	automatically	eliminated	from	contention.		 After	removing	the	above	proposals	from	contention,	several	reforms	remain.	Before	moving	on	with	any	further	narrowing,	it	is	important	that	each	of	the	remaining	reforms	are	revisited	in	order	to	illustrate	how	they	are	likely	to	affect	political	polarization.		 Discussing	first	the	reforms	that	target	the	American	electoral	system,	several	reforms	were	deemed	to	have	an	effect	on	the	levels	of	political	polarization.	The	remaining	proposals	are	as	follows:	the	reform	to	eliminate	voter	ID	laws,	the	
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reform	to	switch	to	independent	redistricting	commissions,	and	the	reform	to	switch	to	a	vote-by-mail	system.	The	proposal	to	eliminate	voter	ID	laws	and	the	proposal	to	switch	to	a	vote-by-mail	system	both	aim	to	affect	political	polarization	by	increasing	voter	turnout,	although	they	do	so	in	different	ways.	Again,	to	revisit	the	logic	behind	increasing	voter	turnout	as	a	means	of	addressing	political	polarization,	the	idea	is	that	by	removing	obstacles	to	voting	you	would	dilute	the	electoral	impact	of	the	far	left	and	far	right,	who	always	turn	out	to	vote,	by	injecting	a	large	number	of	moderate	voters	who	are	less	likely	to	turn	out	to	vote.	The	reform	that	implements	independent	redistricting	commissions	aims	to	affect	political	polarization	by	overhauling	the	drawing	of	congressional	districts	and	balancing	the	electoral	playing	field.	For	each	of	these	reforms,	there	is	scholarly	evidence	that	indicates	that	they	would	be	successful	in	accomplishing	their	goals,	which	enabled	them	to	pass	the	initial	round	of	the	evaluation.		 The	second	set	of	reforms	that	remain	are	the	proposals	that	target	the	American	electorate.	The	two	proposals	that	were	discussed	in	this	section	were,	the	reform	that	creates	a	non-partisan	election	information	guide,	and	the	reform	that	requires	television	news	networks	to	devote	more	campaign	coverage	to	substantive	information.	Both	of	these	reforms	are	centered	on	the	notion	that	a	great	deal	of	the	American	electorate	is	politically	uninformed,	and	that	if	they	were	to	be	provided	additional	information,	either	in	the	form	of	an	election	information	guide	or	news	coverage	of	policy	speeches	and	proposals,	that	they	would	vote	differently.	Significant	research	has	been	conducted	that	shows	that	voters,	in	fact,	do	change	their	ideological	positions	and	voting	behavior,	when	presented	with	new	
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information	pertaining	to	policy	platforms	of	both	political	parties	and	individual	candidates	(Fowler	and	Margolis	2013).	Given	the	research	that	supports	the	merits	of	these	reforms,	they	moved	past	the	initial	stage	of	evaluation.			 The	second	criterion	I	used	in	determining	which	reform	discussed	in	most	worthwhile	of	pursuit,	is	would	the	reform	undermine	the	democratic	values	of	the	United	States?	Of	the	remaining	reforms,	it	was	my	estimation	that	only	one	reform	undermined	the	democratic	values	of	America,	and	that	was	the	proposal	that	aims	to	force	television	news	networks	to	provide	more	substantive	coverage	of	campaigns.	The	concern	surrounding	this	proposal	is	due	to	the	fact	that	this	reform	gives	the	appearance	that	the	government	is	meddling	in	the	First	Amendment	right	of	these	news	networks.	Thus,	if	this	reform	were	to	be	implemented	it	would	undermine	the	protections	of	free	speech	for	all	television	media	outlets.			 Having	applied	the	second	criterion	to	the	remaining	reforms,	the	following	proposals	are	still	in	contention:	the	proposal	to	switch	to	a	vote-by-mail	system,	the	reform	that	implements	independent	redistricting	commissions,	the	proposal	to	provide	a	non-partisan	information	guide	to	the	electorate,	and	finally	the	reform	that	aims	to	eliminate	all	voter	ID	laws.	Before	making	a	final	determination,	it	is	important	that	the	third	and	final	criterion	is	used	to	evaluate	the	discussed	reforms.			 The	final	criterion	used	to	evaluate	the	remaining	reforms	was	whether	or	not	the	reforms	were	politically	viable.	Applying	this	criterion,	to	the	remaining	reforms,	I	determined	that	one	of	the	reforms	was	politically	unviable.	That	reform	was	the	proposal	to	eliminate	voter	ID	laws.	The	pursuit	of	the	reform	that	suggests	
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eliminating	all	voter	ID	laws	would	certainly	lead	to	a	partisan	battle,	given	that	the	Republican	Party	is	responsible	for	the	creation	and	implementation	of	these	ID	laws	in	states	across	the	country.	Thus,	it	is	highly	unlikely	that	any	Republicans	in	government	would	support	such	a	reform,	and	therefore	the	reform’s	political	viability	is	hampered.		 Having	applied	the	three	above	criterion	to	each	of	the	reforms	discussed	in	this	work,	I	have	identified	three	reforms	that	pass	all	the	stages	of	evaluation.	Those	reforms	are:	the	proposal	to	implement	a	vote-by-mail	system,	the	proposal	to	create	a	non-partisan	election	information	guide,	and	the	reform	that	aims	to	implement	independent	redistricting	commissions.	Out	of	these	three	identified	reforms,	it	is	my	estimation	that	the	reform	that	aims	to	provide	a	non-partisan	election	information	guide	is	the	most	worthy	of	pursuit.	Prior	to	explaining	why	I	have	concluded	that	this	reform	is	most	worthy	of	pursuit,	it	is	important	that	the	limitations	of	the	other	two	identified	reforms	are	fleshed	out.		 Although	both	the	proposal	to	implement	a	vote-by-mail	system	and	the	proposal	to	shift	the	redistricting	process	to	an	independent	commission	passed	all	three	of	the	criterion	laid	out,	the	reason	that	they	were	not	selected	as	the	single	reform	most	worthy	of	pursuit	is	that	they	were	less	convincing	the	degree	to	which	they	satisfied	the	criterion.	Specifically,	both	reforms	lacked	resounding	scholarly	support	for	the	notion	that	they	could	affect	the	levels	of	political	polarization.	For	the	redistricting	reform,	there	was	both	scholarly	research	that	supported	the	notion	that	the	reform	could	lower	the	levels	of	political	polarization	and	research	that	indicated	that	the	reform	would	have	minimal	to	no	effect	on	the	levels	of	
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political	polarization	in	America.	Furthermore,	given	the	proposal	to	switch	to	a	vote-by-mail	system	is	has	only	been	recently	implemented	in	places	like	Oregon,	Washington,	and	Colorado,	there	is	only	a	small	amount	of	scholarly	research	that	indicates	the	reform’s	effects	on	political	polarization.	Taking	into	account	the	limited	support	that	both	of	these	reforms	received,	it	was	impossible	for	me	to	select	them	as	the	reform	most	worthy	of	pursuit.		 After	conducting	a	thorough	analysis	of	each	of	the	reforms,	I	have	come	to	the	conclusion	that	the	reform	that	aims	to	provide	additional	non-partisan	electoral	information	to	voters	is	the	most	worthwhile	of	pursuing.	Specifically,	the	information	provided	would	compare	the	ideology	of	every	candidate	in	a	particular	race	as	well	as	provide	an	unbiased	evaluation	of	each	candidate’s	major	policy	proposals.	Revisiting	the	two	guiding	metrics	used	to	evaluate	each	of	the	reforms,	this	reform	is	both	extremely	politically	viable	and	would	be	effective	in	addressing	political	polarization.	The	strong	political	viability	is	derived	from	the	fact	that	elected	officials	from	both	sides	as	well	as	the	general	public	would	emphatically	support	such	a	proposal,	given	that	it	grants	the	public	access	to	even	more	information	and	provides	an	added	degree	of	political	transparency	to	elections.	This	reform	would	address	political	polarization	by	reforming	how	individuals	choose	whom	to	vote	for.	The	introduction	of	non-partisan	information	on	candidates’	ideologies,	as	well	as	evaluations	of	major	candidate	policy	proposals,	would	provide	insight	to	voters	that	they	currently	do	not	have	access	to.	This	information	would	specifically	allow	voters	to	see	how	these	candidates	would	impact	the	levels	of	polarization	in	government	and	would	lead	voters	to	change	
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their	ideological	leanings	and	vote	choice,	as	studies	have	shown.	Furthermore,	this	reform	is	unique	in	the	sense	that	it	has	the	ability	to	not	only	impact	the	levels	of	political	polarization	in	government	by	changing	the	voting	habits	of	the	American	public	but	also	bridge	some	of	the	ideological	gap	between	the	general	public	by	opening	their	eyes	to	new	information.	Although	this	reform	faces	a	great	deal	of	challenges	to	its	successful	implementation,	most	notably	the	questions	of	how	to	properly	disseminate	this	information	and	how	will	this	information	be	received	by	the	public,	it	is	clear	that	this	reform	does	not	fall	into	many	of	the	pitfalls	that	its	peers	succumb	to.			 Throughout	the	course	of	my	research,	I	examined	each	of	these	reforms	potentials	individually,	without	taking	into	account	how	each	of	the	reforms	would	affect	one	another.	Therefore,	it	is	important	that	the	effects	of	these	proposals	be	discussed	in	combination	with	one	another.			 The	main	limitation	that	a	great	deal	of	these	reforms	face	is	that	they	rely	upon	the	presence	of	moderate	individuals	running	for	political	office.		Proposals	like	the	ones	that	target	the	American	electorate	are	focused	on	pushing	more	Americans	to	support	moderate	candidates,	but	who’s	to	say	there	would	be	any	moderate	candidates	to	support	to	begin	with.	In	that	sense,	the	reforms	that	target	the	American	electorate	are	also	reliant	upon	changes	in	the	primary	election	system	and	the	redistricting	process,	which	would	foster	a	political	environment	habitable	for	moderate	candidates.	Given	that	reality,	it	is	possible	that	although	individually	the	proposal	to	overhaul	primary	elections	does	not	possess	a	great	deal	of	merit,	it	would	be	necessary	to	implement	that	reform	prior	to	pursuing	
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reforms	that	target	the	American	electorate	in	order	to	efficiently	address	political	polarization.				 Another	limitation	that	appears	if	one	were	to	discuss	the	effects	of	the	various	proposals	in	combination	is	the	fact	that	if	the	effects	of	political	polarization	were	minimal,	there	would	likely	be	no	support	to	enact	reforms	that	address	the	issue.	For	example,	if	the	filibuster	were	to	be	altered	or	eliminated	entirely,	Congress	would	likely	emerge	from	its	state	of	gridlock,	which	is	one	of	the	main	effects	of	political	polarization	that	pundits	and	scholars	point	to.	If	this	were	to	be	the	case,	the	average	voter,	who	does	not	necessarily	understand	the	problem	of	political	polarization	as	it	stands	now,	could	possibly	care	even	less	about	addressing	the	levels	of	political	polarization	than	they	do	now.	In	that	sense,	not	only	does	the	success	of	some	reforms	rely	upon	the	implementation	of	other	reforms,	but	also	all	of	the	reforms	depend	on	proposals	that	mitigate	the	effects	of	political	polarization	not	being	implemented.			
Research	Limitations:			 		 As	is	the	case	with	any	research,	there	are	limitations	and	the	same	can	be	said	about	my	research	for	this	work.	The	main	limitation	that	I	faced	throughout	my	research	is	that	a	great	deal	of	the	reforms	that	were	discussed	have	yet	to	be	implemented	and	thus	the	available	information	pertaining	to	the	reform’s	ability	to	affect	political	polarization	is	severely	limited.	This	was	the	case	for	several	reforms,	including	reforms	that	aim	to	strengthen	the	political	parties	as	well	as	for	the	reform	proposing	to	eliminate	the	debt	ceiling.	The	effect	of	this	limitation	on	my	
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conclusion	is	that	I	was	forced	to	determine	which	reform	would	be	most	worthwhile	of	pursuing	without	a	uniform	level	of	information	about	each	reform	discussed.	Thus,	if	new	research	were	to	emerge	that	indicates	that	strengthening	political	parties	would	significantly	reduce	the	levels	of	political	polarization	in	America,	my	conclusion	might	differ	from	the	one	presented	above.	This	limitation	is	likely	to	be	continuously	faced	by	researchers	focusing	on	solutions	to	political	polarization	as	reforms	are	continuously	being	generated.			 A	second	limitation	that	I	faced	during	the	course	of	my	research	was	that	several	of	the	reforms	discussed	have	been	implemented	in	individual	states	across	the	country,	but	not	enough	time	has	elapsed	to	determine	their	true	impact	on	political	polarization.	This	was	the	case	for	the	aforementioned	proposal	to	switch	to	a	vote-by-mail	system,	as	well	as	for	switching	to	alternative	forms	of	primary	elections.	This	limitation	again	impacted	my	conclusions,	given	that	without	a	full	understanding	of	the	effects	of	a	reform,	I	was	left	to	make	a	determination	based	on	the	present	understanding	of	the	reform’s	effects.	As	reforms	continue	to	be	studied	it	is	likely	that	new	research	will	unveil	a	greater	understanding	of	the	recently	implemented	reforms,	thus	likely	modifying	the	conclusions	of	future	works	that	have	the	same	aim	as	my	research.		 A	third	limitation,	which	was	less	significant	that	the	first	two,	was	that	not	all	areas	of	reform	were	written	about	with	similar	depth.	During	my	research,	I	found	it	much	easier	to	locate	scholarly	work	written	about	certain	reforms	that	were	discussed	than	others.	While	there	was	an	abundance	of	work	done	on	governmental	reforms	and	electoral	reforms,	there	was	less	work	to	be	found	on	the	
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topic	of	reforming	political	parties	to	address	political	polarization.		As	my	aim	was	to	evaluate	each	of	these	reforms,	the	reforms	that	had	less	written	about	them	were	limited	in	their	ability	to	be	fully	analyzed.	Thus	as	research	continues	to	be	conducted,	future	works	may	come	to	alternative	conclusions	based	on	new	studies	conducted.	
Notes	for	Further	Research:		 Moving	forward,	the	push	back	against	political	polarization	must	be	strong	and	unified.	Scholars,	politicians,	and	political	pundits	alike	all	need	to	understand	that	this	issue	threatens	to	erode	the	functionality	of	our	government	and	the	general	discourse	of	politics.	Political	polarization	has	already	created	a	great	deal	of	political	uncertainty	and	unrest,	and	if	not	addressed	its	effects	could	easily	be	crippling.	In	that	sense,	each	of	these	three	actors	must	be	vigilant	in	their	outspoken	criticism	of	polarization	and	simultaneously	raise	awareness	amongst	the	general	public	about	the	threat	that	political	polarization	poses	to	America.		 Scholars	should	continue	to	propose	and	research	various	reforms	that	aim	to	address	political	polarization,	specifically	focusing	on	reforms	that	address	the	issue	of	political	polarization	head	on,	not	simply	mitigate	its	effects.	Additionally,	scholars	should	constantly	be	focused	on	studying	the	effects	of	political	polarization.	These	studies	will	not	only	raise	awareness	to	the	damaging	effect	that	political	polarization	has,	but	it	will	almost	certainly	spur	a	larger	call	for	action.	By	continuously	producing	research	on	political	polarization,	scholars	will	not	only	provide	a	foundation	of	support	for	others	to	call	for	action	but	will	also	act	as	a	guide	for	the	steps	that	can	be	taken	to	address	the	issue	of	political	polarization.	
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	 Members	of	government	at	all	levels	should	continue	to	fund	studies	and	provide	grants	for	research	that	focuses	on	political	polarization,	as	once	members	of	Congress	become	serious	about	addressing	the	issue	they	can	use	their	platform	to	raise	awareness	amongst	the	general	public.	Additionally,	by	having	elected	officials	illustrate	the	dangers	of	political	polarization,	it	will	almost	certainly	elevate	the	issue	to	one	of	national	importance,	making	any	opposition	to	addressing	it	politically	unviable.		 Finally,	political	pundits	should	write	articles	and	spread	stories	that	illustrate	the	need	for	focus	on	this	topic.	Again,	the	focus	here	is	to	stir	up	public	awareness	and	force	individuals	to	take	action	to	address	political	polarization.		By	discussing	the	issue	on	Sunday	talk	shows,	on	nightly	newscasts	and	in	the	pages	of	the	local	and	national	papers,	Americans	will	have	no	choice	but	to	acknowledge	the	seriousness	of	the	issue.			 In	all,	the	issue	of	political	polarization	is	one	that	is	likely	to	remain	relevant	in	American	political	discourse	until	actors	are	willing	to	devote	significant	time	and	resources	to	addressing	the	problem	that	currently	plagues	politics	in	the	United	States.		Moving	forward	it	is	important	that	there	is	a	unified	effort	among	many	political	actors	to	both	raise	awareness	to	political	polarization	and	create	solutions	to	address	the	problem	of	political	polarization.			 	
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